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Chile's  success  suggests  that  fiscal  stabilization  is a prerequisite
for structural  reform  - and that structural  reform  need not be
postponed  until stabilization  is fully achieved.
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ing between  consolidated  nonfinancial  public  public  spending  and taxation  crowd in or crowd
deficits  and quasifiscal  losses  of the Central  out private spending.
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In the framework  of an estimated  portfolio  trade surplus.
model,  they simulate  the path  of domestic
inflation  and interest  rates  for money-financed  Chile's successful  experience  suggests  that
and debt-financed  deficits.  fiscal stabilization  is a prerequisite  for structural
reform  - and that structural  reform  need not be
Then they trace the  effects  of deficits,  and  postponed  until stabilization  is fully achieved.
their form of finncing, on private  consumption
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Chile has faced massive  external shocks and policy  changes during the last two decades. Public
finance has been at the center of the policy shifts, and fiscal deficits varied accordingly. This paper
analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal deficits in Chile since 1974 and up to the present.
TABLE  1.1
SELECT-ED MACROECONOMIC INDlCATORS (1970-89)
Non-Financial
Year  GDP Growth  Inflation  Current  Public Sector 
(t)  (%)  Account  Surplus
(% of GDP)  (% of GDP)
1970-73  0.7  204.3  -2.4  -23.4
1974  1.0  369.2  -0.5  - 5.5
1975  -12.9  343.3  -5.2  - 2.1
1976  3.5  197.9  1.7  4.0
1977  9.9  84.2  -3.7  0.4
1978  8.2  37.2  -5.2  1.4
1979  8.3  38.9  -5.4  4.6
1980  7.8  31.2  -7.0  5.4
1981  5.5  9.5  -14.4  0.4
1982  -14.1  20.7  -9.2  -3.9
1983  -0.7  23.1  -5.4  -3.5
1984  6.3  23.0  -10.7  -4.6
1985  2.4  26.4  -8.3  -2.9
1986  5.6  17.4  -6.9  -2.0
1987  5.7  21.5  4.3  -0.2
1988  7.4  12.7  -0.7  3.6
1989  10.0  21.4  -3.1  3.8
Sources:  Central Bank and Budget Office.
w Includes general government and public enterprises.-2-
The  evolution of the  economy during the period is summarized in Table  1.1.  From the
perspective of fiscal policy and macroeconomic adjustment this period may be broken into several
subperiods.
The first two years of the 1974-1989  period were characterized by a major stabilization effort
aimed at correcting the macroeconomic  imbalances inherited from the Allende government. During
this period most prices were liberalized,  real assets that had been transferred to the state during 1970-
73 were returned to the private sector, the exchange rate was sharply devalued, and contractionary
monetary and fiscRl  policies were carried out to restore internal and external balances.  As a result
of both the stabilization policies and adverse foreign shocks, GDP declined by almost 13% in 1975,
the unemployment rate jumped to 15%, and real wages declined to 65% of their  970 level.
Beginning in 1976,  Chile experienced four years of recovery with GDP growing  at an averagc
annual 7.5%.  However, inflation was still high, largely due to the crawling peg rule of the nominal
exchange rate.  During this period the government carried out radical structural reforms, liberalizing
domestic markets as well as external trade.  Between 1975 and 1979 tariffs were reduced from high
and widely  varying  levels to an almost flat structure of 10%. Interest rates were freed and most banks
were privatized during this period.
A significant fiscal adjustment was achieved very early in this period.  The key active fiscal
policies were the reduction of current and capital expenditure and the increase in public enterprise
tariffs.
The  1980-81 years  correspond  to  a  foreign-financed, private  expenditure  boom.  The
govemment, after three years of pre-announcing the path of the nominal exchange level, decided to
fix this rate indefinitely in 1979  with the aim of achieving  a convergence of domestic inflation to the
external level.  A combination of elements -- overestimated private wealth levels, high real wage
increases due  to  backward indexation, and the capital account liberalization during a  period of3-
unlimited foreign funds' -- contnbuted  to the spending frenzy of the private sector.  As a result,
private external debt jumped from US$2.7  billion in 1978  to $8.1 billion in 1981. The current account
deficit peaked at 14.4% of GDP in 1981.
As oppK.  J to most other developing country experiences, the public sector in Chile refrained
from running deficits during the period of easy access to foreign funds.  In fact, the 1978-SI phase
is characterized by a sequence of surpluses in the public budget as a result of the preceding reforms.
However, during the same period a radical reform of the social security system was implemente
The old scheme -- a state owned pay-as-you-go  system  - was replaced by a capitalization system run
by private  corporations.  This reform had  -- and  still has -- strong  fiscal effects because  the
government has to finance the transition period.  This implies paying pensions to  the population
which did retire  or  will retire  under  the old  system, without receiving the  revenues from the
increasing share of the active population that was affiliated to the new private social security funds.
The counterpart of this higher public deficit is an increase in private sector saving, part of which is
financing the public sector by acquiring domestic public debt.
1982  and 1983  are the years of the debt crisis. After (and already before) August 1982  external
credits dried out and the economy  started a painful adjustment path resulting from reduced domestic
spending in an economy unable to generate the price adjustment required to avoid a strong recession.
The required real exchange rate depreciation did not materialize until 1983 due to the combination
of a  fLxed  exchange rate policy and  full backward wage indexation.  As a  result of this "double
nominal anchor" problem, the adjustment was highly recessionary: GDP fell sharply, by 14% during
1982, and unemployment sks-rocketed to 30% the following  year.  In the medium term, the real
'For a discussion of the causality between domestic spending, foreign lending and the real
excharge rate during this period see Morandd and Schmidt-Hebbel (1988), in particular chapter 5.-4-
exchange rate  and real wage adjustment made possible an expansion of exports, activity levels
recovered, and the current account deficit was significantly  reduced.
During these years a significant change in the public sector balance took place.  An initial
surplus of 5.4% of GDP in 1980 revers A into a 4.0% deficit in  982. Both government revenue and
expenditure were severely hit by the debt crisis,  reflecting the decline in GDP and the deterioration
of the terms of trade.  Total tax revenue fell from 26%o  of GDP  in 1980 to 22% in 1982.  Also,
employment emergency programs had to be financed after the burst of unemployment in 1983.
The  1984-1986  period is characterized by a major fiscal adjustment program aimed at both
stabilization and structural  reforms.  While a  reduction in current  and capital expenditure was
achieved, a new tax reform was implemented. Direct tax rates were signiificantly  reduced with the
purpose of encouraging private saving and investment. However, the most important fiscal policy
innovations of this period were the so-called  quasi-fiscal  operations. In order to avoid the breakdown
of the whole financial system,  the government decided to assist the private sector by providing  Central
Bank credits at subsidized rates and exchange rate subsidies to debtors in foreign currency. These
credits attained such levels that Central Bank real liabilities  grew by a factor of 3.5 during the 1985-
1988 period.
The last period, 1987-1989,  is characterized by relative macroecornomic  stability, high growth
and fiscal consolidation. At the end of the 1980s,  the Chilean econowrv ' 'ws  a healthy condition.
During these last years GDP has grown at an average 7.7% per year, inflation has averaged 18% per
yea:, and the unemployment rate has declined to 5% in 1989.
With regard to fiscal  policy, this final phase shows a recovery of public finances. Fiscal  deficits
turned into surpluses as a result of ;he economic recoveiy, an increase of public enterprise surpluses
and a recovery in the price of copper.-5-
Hence there are three crucial  aspects of the management of fiscal  policy  in Chile during the 1980s
which are noteworthy.  First, the tax and expenditure reforms contributed to a leaner government
sector, to which the privatization of public enterprises made a significant  contribution.  Second, the
1981 social security reform caused a large negative effect on the public sector budget, which *vill  last
for the period of demographic transition to the new system.  This implies that it is hard to make
meaningful comparisons of fiscal accounts before and after the reform. Third, in order to avoid the
collapse of the financial system, the government established a series of subsidized operations to the
banking system and its debtors.  An implication  of this is that the increase in the domestic public debt
was related to transfer payments to the private sector.  These three aspects of the management of
fiscal deficits in Chile were crucial in the macroeconomic  adjustment during the 1980s.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of fiscal policy in Chile
during the  1974-1988  period emphasizing the structure and decomposition of non-financial public
sector deficits, the scope of quasi-fiscal  operations, and the sustainability of public sector deficits.
Section 3 develops a three-asset portfolio model in order to estimate the impact of domestic deficit
financing on  interest  and  inflation rates and assess the  implications of  alternative strategies of
domestic financing of public deficits.  Section 4 analyzes direct and indirect fiscal policy effects on
private consumption and investment. Section 5 estimates the impact of public sector deficits on real
exchange rates and the current account.  Section 6 concludes.-6-
2. FISCAL POLICY, DE.COMPOSITION OF 1974-1988  DEFICITS
AA:) SUSTAINABILITY OF THE DEFICIT
This section analyzes the evolution of fiscal policy in Chile since 1974. A brief introduction
describing the evolution of fiscal  policy during the 1974-1988  starts the discussion. In subsection 2.2
a decomposition of the non-financial public sector deficit is performed, which allows to distinguish
between exogenous and endogenous fiscal policy determinants of the deficits. A quantification of
quasi-fiscal operations is presented in 2.3.  Finally, subsect;on 2.4 looks at deficit sustainability by
presenting simulation results for the financing of the puiblic  sector deficit and for the primary su.plus
of the public sector under alternative public debt/GDP paths.
2.1  Fiscal Policies durin2 1974-1988
Table 2.1 shows the main determinants of the consolidated non-financial public sector deficits
during the 1974-1988  period. There are four well-defined  subperiods regarding the evolution of the
public sector deficit during these years.
The first subperiod covers the 1974-75  years during w,..n  a drastic process of fiscal  stabilization
was carried out by the new military  government.  The last year of the Allende administration, 1973,
was characterized by a huge fiscal imbalance resulting from large public enterprises losses,  a decrease
in fiscal revenues due to the Keynes-Olivera-Tanzi  effect, and an over-expansion of public sector
wages, employment and social security payments. In 1973 the public sector deficit climbed  over 20%
of GDi-, being financed by a huge inflation  ;i
The Pinochet government cut abruptly fiscal  spending, reducing real wages, the public pay roll,
and public investment. Tax rates were raised and many firms - which had been transferred to the
state  by the Allende govemment - were  returned  to  the private sector.  Th-  remaining public
enterprises were required to behave as private firms maximizing  profits.  In 1975, a tax reform-7-
Table  2.1  :  Chile:  Ion-Finmncial  PubLic Sector  Operations
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
General Goverrnent
Current Revenues 30.3  34.9  37.4  38.6  33.2  32.5  32.9  32.1  29.9  27.7  28.7  28.6  28.2  28.4  28.7
Direct  Taxes  5.7  8.3  7.0  5.4  5.3  5.2  5.4  5.5  4.8  3.1  3.4  3.1  3.2  3.1  2.9
Indirect  Taxes  13.0  14.6  14.0  14.9  13.7  13.3  13.4  14.8  13.8  14.6  16.3  17.1  17.1  17.3  14.5
Copper  Taxes  1.7  1.3  2.6  2.6  2.8  1.9  1.9 0.2  1.0  1.9  1.3  0.5  0.6  1.1  4.7
Sociat Security  3.1  3.4  3.4  3.7  3.7  5.3  5.6  4.7  3.3  2.8  2.8  2.4  2.5  2.2  1.9
Other Incomes  6.8  7.3  10.3  12.1 7.7 6.7 6.6 6.9  7.2 5.3  5.0 5.5 4.9 4.7 4  7
Current Expendit.  26.4  27.6  31.0  33.0  26.8  24.8  24.5  26.7  31.9  30.6  30.7  29.5  27.4  26.3  23.2
Purchases  4.3 4.4 3.7 4.9 4.7  1,0 3.1  2.9 3.3 3.2  3.4 3.2 3.0 3.3  2.7
Wages  10.0  9.3 8.9  11.0  10.0 9.2 9.1 8.8 10.3 8.9 8.5  7.8 7.4 6.8  6.2
Domestic  Interests  0.4  0.5 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.0  1.3 1.8 2.L 1.2  4.7  1.8
External Interests  0.9  2.1 2.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6  0...  1.1  1.3 1.3
Total  Transfers  6.4  10.3  12.3  12.2  9.8  10.8  10.9  14.1  17.3  16.3  16.2  15.0  14.3  1.0  11.2
Other  expenditures  4.3  1.1  3.9  3.2  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.1
Savings  3.9  7.3  6.3  5.6  6.5  7.;  8.4  5.5  -1.9  -2.9  -2.0  -0.9  0.8  2.1  5.5
Pubtic  Investment  8.7  5.7  3.1  4.2  3.5  3.2  2.6  2.5  2.1  2.1  2.3  3.1  3.3  3.0  2.9
Other  Expenditures  1.9  1.6  0.1  0.5  0.8  -0.7  0.3  0.1  -1.8  -1.9  -0.7  -0.4  -0.8  -0.6  -0.8
Surplus  -6.6  -0.0  3.1  0.9  2.1  5.1  5.5  2.9  -2.3  -3.1  -3.5  -3.6  -1.7  -0.3  3.4
.......  ............  ..  ..  ....  ,.........  . ...  ...........  ...................  .................  ................................ _.  .......
Public  Enterprises
Current  Revenues  32.8  35.9  31.0  26.6  24.7  27.0  25.8  20.8  24.2  29.5  29.8  35.3  35.4  34.7  37.8
Current  Expenditur  25.3  30.2  20.5  18.4  18.3  17.6  16.3  15.6  16.5  18.5  19.2  21.2  22.6  21.8  22.2
Net  Savings  7.5  5.7  10.5  8.2  6.4  9.4  9.5  5.2  7.7  11.0  10.6  14.1  12.8  12.9  15.6
Taxes and  Transfer  4.8  5.4  6.9  5.2  4.4  8.3  7.5  5.6  7.1  8.6  8.2  9.6  9.1  9.7  12.6
Investment  3.9  3.5  3.0  2.7  3.2  1.9  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  3.7  4.0  4.7  4.0  3.3
Other Income  2.3  1.1  0.3  -0.8  0.4  0.2  0.5  0.4  0.3  -0.1  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.9  0.6
Surplus  1.2  -2.1  0.9  -0.5  -0.8  -0.5  -0.1  -2.5  -1.6  -0.4  -1.1  0.8  -0.4  0.1  0.3
_  ...............................  ....................................... I........................................................._
Consolidated
Surplus  -5.5  -2.1  4.0  0.4  1.3  4.6  5.4  0.3  -3.9  -3.5  -4.5  -2.9  -2.1  -0.2  3.7
Financing  5.5  2.1  -4.0  -0.4  -1.3  -4.6  -5.4  -0.3  3.9  3.5  4.5  2.9  2.1  0.2  -3.7
Interna1  5.2  5.0  -0.9  0.q  -4.0  -4.6  -5.3  -3.1  1.7  2.4  1.8  -1.1  -1.0  -2.2  -7.3
External  0.3  -2.9  -3.1  -0.3  2.7  0.0  -0.1  2.8  2.2  1.1  2.7  4.0  3.1  2.4  3.6 .e  i  o  F  ce..........................................................................
Source: Budget Office,  llinistry  of  Ffnarice.8-
introduced  the value-added  tax, simplitfing  notably  the tax system  and indexing  the tax base  As a
result  of these  policies,  the pubhic  sector deficit  was  quickly  reduced. In 1975,  the deficit  as a fraction
of  IDP  was  only 2%.
The second subperiod covers the  1976-1981  years.  The public sector showed inrporiant
surpluses,  allowing  for a reduction  in domestic  public  debt. Having  stabilized  the fiscal  deficits  in the
previous  years,  public  finances  were favored  by the recovery  of growth,  the new tax  system,  and the
profit maximizing  behavior  of public  enterprises.
The third subperiod  goes  from 1982  until 1986. The debt crisis  in 1982  triggered  a sequence
of public  sector deficits. The recession  that followed  the debt crisis  produced  a fall in public  sector
revenues,  particularly  in external  trade related  taxes. The huge unemployment  ra  (30% in 1983)
forced  the government  to undertake  a series  of programs  that increased  fiscal  spending. During  that
period, the gcovcrnment  undertook two  structural reforms  that contributed to the deterioration  of
public  finances.  First,  a state-rut pay-as-you-go  social  security  system  was  replaced  by a privately  run
fully  funded  system,  deepening  an already  existing  deficit  in the public  social  security  system.  Second,
a tax reforn aimed  at raising  private investment  reduced  progressively  direct tax rates after 1983.
However,  tle most importan'  fiscal  policy  brought  about  by the debt crisis  were the quasiGiscal
operations carried out by the Central Bank.  Beginning  in  1983, the Central Bank rescued a
technically  bankrupt financial  system  using a package  of subsidized  loans. A similar  operation  was
aimed  at helping  private domestic  and external  debtors. These operations  are called  quasi-fiscal  to
the extent that they respond to a fiscal  instrument  (subsidies)  used by the Central Bank.  This
institution  experimented  heavy  losses  as a consequence  of the referred policies,  which  were financed
by transfers  from the general government.
Table 2.2 shows  estimates  of total public  sector defir.its  after taking  into account  quasi-fiscal
operations. It is not simple  to measure  the contribution  of the Central Bank to the consolidateddeficit due to its accrual base accounting system.  Two available estimates are shown in table 2.2.
Both of them contain accrued terms, so they are not strictly comparable with thc non-financial  deficit
(measured on a cash  ase)  Anyhow, it is evident from table 2.2 that quasi-fiscal  operations were an
essenfial component of fiscal policy during the 1980s.
Finally, the  1987-1989 period shows a strengthening of public sector  finances, which not
surprisingly parallels the behavior of most macroeconomic  indicators. A significant contribution to
this recovery was played by public enterprises, which benefited from high GDP growth, a recovery
in copper prices and, running foreign exchange surpluses also were favored by the depreciated real
exchange rate.
2.2  Decomogsition of Public Sector Deficits
The  decomposition of  the  non-financial public sector  deficit attempts  to  measure  the
contribution of exoger.ous and endogenous fiscal policy  variables to the fiscal  deficit, following  closely
our methodology presented elsewhere (see Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1989a, b  and a compact
presentation in the appendix of Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991).  Endogenous variables are
those under the control of fiscal policymaklen:  tax rates, public investment, public sector wages, and
so on. Exogenous variables are domestic and external variables that affect the fiscal deficit but are
beyond the direct control of the fiscal policymaker,  such as inflation, output growth, interest rates,
or the real exchange rate.- 10-
TABLE  2.2
NON-FINANCIAL,  QUASI-FISCAL  AND TOTAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICIT
(% of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
(1) Non financial  -5.4  -0.3  4.0  3.3  4.5  2.9  1.6  -0.3  3.6
Public Sector
Deficit
(2) Central Bank  -1.1  -1.9  -1.4  0.5  2.9  4.7  4.9  3.8  2.9
Net Interest
Payments
(3) Central Bank  -1.0  -1.5  -0.6  6.2  6.3  21.0  4.2  0.5  5.2
Losses
Total Deficit
(1) + (2)  -6.5  -2.2  2.6  3.8  7.4  6.6  6.5  3.5  -0.7
(1) +  (3)  ).4  -1.8  3.4  9.5  10.8  23.9  5.8  0.2  1.6
Sources: Table 2.1 and Central Bank Balance Sheets.
There are two altematives to decompose fiscal variables, depending if they are classified as
behavioral variables. For non-behavioral fiscal variables, an accounting decomposition is performed
as shown by the following  example. Let WL/PY be the wage bill paid by the government, as a share
of current-price GDP.  Then the discrete-time change in this ratio can be written as follows:
(2.1)  [WL/PY  t- 1WL/PYJ e-1=  [WL/P1  t-l(1  +  +  £  - P - +  RIwhere hats (^) denote the corresponding percentage rates of change and R represents the algebraic
residual due to the sum of the products of discrete-time rates of change.
The above expression illustrates the change in a fiscal  variable, decomposed by the variation
of  endogenous  policy variables  (wage  rate,  W,  and  public employment,  L)  and  exogenous
macroeconomic  variables (GDP deflator, P, and real GDP, Y).  Generalizing this procedure to other
fiscal variables, it is straightforward to decompose the evolution of the public sector deficit into its
endogenous and exogenous macroeconomic  determinants.
For behavioral fiscal  variables the decomposition is based on their behavioral structure. Take
for example the following  equation for constant-price tax revenue:
(2.2)  (T/P)  t  =  ao  +  alrt  +  a27t  +  a3e
where real tax revenue (T/P) is a function of real output, the inflation rate (a)  and the real exchange
rate (e).  The decomposition of the change in tax revenue as a fraction of GDP can be written as:
(2.3)  A(T/P)t  =  (7IPY),_ja,(PYI7),_,-l)Y  + a2(P1T),_,di + a3 (eP/7),lD.
In  this  case  the  decomposition uses  the  least  squares estimators  a,  for  the  unknown
coefficients a, that relate tax revenue to its structural determinants.
Table 2.3 shows the list of decomposed fiscal variables, the methodology of decomposition,
and the endogenous and exogenous variables that were used in the decomposition. Five public sector
variables are decomposed using the estimation procedure: direct taxes, indirect taxes, copper taxes,
public enterprises surplus, and total transfers to the private sector. The last variable includes all the
transfers given by the government to the private sector, including social security payments.- 12  -
In the case of direct and indirect taxes, real income, the inflation rate and the real exchange
rate are the main determinants of tax revenue. The change in tax structures -and the corresponding
change in tax rates - are reflected by changes in appropriate dunmny  variables. OLS estimation results
are shown in table 2.4.
Taxes from the copper industry are a function of the real exchange rate and the price of
copper.  Total transfers to the private sector were correlated with real income and the inflation rate.
Finally, the public enterprise surplus was related to the exchange rate and the copper price.
The results of the non-financial public sector deficit decomposition are shown in tables 2.5 -
2.7. To avoid unnecessary detail the annual results were aggregated into four subperiods covering
1974-1988,  relevant for fiscal policy (see section 2.1).2
Table  2.5 shows the  decomposition results for public sector revenue, which registers an
impressive improvement during the first subperiod, a slight deterioration in the second period, and
only minor changes during 1982-86  and 1987-8.
The massive 19.7 percentage point of GDP increase in public sector revenue during 1974-75
reflects a significant recovery in tax revenue and public firm surpluses. In turn, the improvement in
tax revenues is explained by changes in effective tax rates due to  the  1974 tax reform and  the
reduction in tax evasion.
Declining effective tax rates during 1976-81  reflect higher levels of tax evasion. A negative
effect on revenue is also due to the declining number of affiliates to the old social security system,
as a result of the already mentioned reform.
qThe figures in these tables denote cumulative changes of the corresponding variables.  For
instance, the cumulative variation in direct taxes in 1974-75,  i.e. between 1973 and 1975 levels, is
3.2 percentage points of GDP.- 13  -
Table 2.3
DECOMPOSED  PUBLIC SECTOR  VARIABLE
Fiscal  Variable  Methodology  Endogenous  and Exogenous
Variables
Direct  Taxes  Estimation  Copper price
Exchange  Rate
Real Income
Effective  tax rate
Direct Taxes  Estimation  Real Income
Effective  tax rate
Indirect  Taxes  Estimaticn  Real income
Inflation
Effective  tax rate
Social  Security  Accounting  System  Affiliates
Revenues  Effective  tax rate
Real income
Purchases  of  Accounting  Real purchases
Goods and Services  Income
Wage Bill  Accounting  Public  real wage
Public  employment
Real Income
Total Transfers  Estimation  Real income
Inflation
Interest Payments  Accounting  Debt Stock
Interest rate
Nominal  income
Public  Investment  Accounting  Real Investment
Real Income
Pubic Enterprise  Estimation  Exchange  Rate
Surplus  Copper price
Real income-14-
Table  2.4
Estmaetion  Results  of Behavioral  Public  Sector  Variables  (1973-1989)
Dependent  lndependent  Variables
Variable
Const Income  Exchange Inflation  Copper  Di  D2  Rg  DW
Rate  Rate  Price
1.  Direct  506.3  3.36  298  -494  .73  1.7
Taxes  (.93)  (1.92)  (2.2)  (3.0)
2. Indirect  364.9  10.65  -0.91  786  1833  .95  1.6
Taxes  (0.5)  (4.4)  (1.5)  (2.1)  (2.9)
3.  Copper  -84.9  -6.34  7.41  27.7  .54  1.4
Taxes  (0.2)  (1.9)  (1.6)  (3.4)
4.  Public  -2869  43.0  23.5  .92  1.9
Firns  (4.6)  (10.3)  (3.3)
Surplus
5. Total  1121  11.2  -3.8  .65  1.6
Transfers  (0.5)  (1.8)  (1.6)
to  Private
Sector
1/  Direct  taxes  and transfers  are  a function  of lagged  income.
'/  D1w1.0  for 1975-81,  0 for 1982-89  ln  the case  of  direct  taxes.
61-1.0  for 1975-83,  0  for 1984-89  In the  case  of indirect  taxes.
3/ t-statatices  are reported  for  each  regression.
XI Sample  period: 1975-1989.-15-
Table  2.5
Decomposition  of Public  Sector  Revenues
(Changes  in Revenue  caused  by their  Determinants,
in  Percentage  Points  of GDP)')
1974-75  1976-81  1982-86  98748
Direct  Taxces  3.2  -2.8  -2.3  -0.3
Real Income  -0.1  0.6  -0.1  0.3
Effective  rate  3.3  -3.4  -2.1  -0.6
Indirect  Taxes  4.4  0.1  2.3  -2.5
Real Income  -1.3  4.7  0.0  1.4
Inflation  0.4  0.8  0.0  0.0
Effective  rate  5.4  -5.5  2.4  -3.9
Copper  Taxes  0.7  -1.0  0.3  4.1
Copper  price  -3.1  2.3  -1.2  3.9
Exchange  rate  1.2  -0.6  1.5  0.1
Real income  0.7  -2.7  0.0  -0.8
Effective  rate  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.8
Social  Security  -1.2  1.3  -2.2  -0.6
Nwmber  of affiliates  0.1  -1.8  -1.1  -2.4
Real  wage  0.0  1.5  0.4  0.1
Real income  0.4  -1.8  0.8  -0.3
Remainder  -1.7  3.4  -1.7  0.2
Other  Incomes  4.2  -0.6  -2.0  -0.1
Sector  Income
Public  Evtervrise  8.4  -0.4  2.1  0.7
Sur2 us 3/
Total  Variation  19.7  -3.0  -1.8  1.2
Notest  1/  The  variation  of a  variable  in 1974-75  is the  change  between
the  1973  and  1975  levels. The  same  applies  to  other  periods.
2/  The  effective tax  rate  include tax  evasion and  other
fluctuations  in tax  revenues.
3I  Net  of taxes  and  transfere  to the  government  (see  text).- 16 -
The copper price plays an important role through its impact on copper  tax revenue.  Its
strongly negative contribution in the first subperiod and its positive influence on  public revenue
during the last subperiod are particularly noteworthy.
The impact of privatizations on public finances is hidden in the 'Other  Public Sector Income"
account.  The contnbution of these asset sales to fiscal income has not been large in spire of the
number of privatized enterprises.
Note  also  that  the  surplus of  public enterprises  is net  of  taxes  and  transfers  to  the
government.  It is not possible from the available information to decompose tax revenue between
private and public enterprise contributions. The same applies to "Other Public  Sector Income",  which
includes transfers from public firms.
In this respect, it is interesting to decompose the difference between public enterprise current
income and expenditure, a proxy for profits obtained by this sector.  The so-defined "profits"  have
three uses:  taxes and transfers to the government, capital formation, and the surplus presented in
table 2.5.  Table 2.6 presents this additional information.
This table reflects the importance of the real exchange rate and the copper price for Chilean
public finances.  The sensitivity to the real exchange rate reflects the dominance of tradable-goods
producing firms among public enterprises and particularly the size of the state  copper company
(CODELCO) among them. Hence the strong 1982-86  real devaluations  contributed to a massive  9.1
percentage point (of GDP) improvement in public enterprise profits. The important role of the price
of copper reflects again the share of CODELCO in public enterprises.
Table 2.6 also suggests the structural change in the behavior of public firms, which started
maximizing  profits in 1974. This is reflected by the residual term, which accounts for the effect of
variables other than the exchange rate and the copper price in the evolution of public firms profits.- 17 -
TABLE 2.6
DECOMPOSITION  OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE PROFIEM
(Changes  in Profits  caused  by their D'terminants
in Percentage  Points  of GDI;
1974-75  1976-81  1982-86  1987.88
Total Variation  11.6  -0.4  7.6  2.8
Exchange  rate  7.4  -3.5  9.1  0.8
Copper price  -2.7  2.0  -1.0  3.3
Non-explained  Variation  6.9  1.1  -0.5  -1.3
Table 2.7 shows  the decomposition  results for public  sector expenditures. Looking  at the
variation  in total expenditures,  it turns out that sector public  spending  as a share  of GDP contracted
significantly  during  the 1976-81  and 1987-88  periods.
Decreasing  levels  of public  employment  and investment  caused  large  declines  in public  sector
expenditures  between 1974  and 1981. Fiscal  adjustment  during this period was associated  with a
decline  in the size of government  as measured  by public  employment  and investment.  On the other
side, inflation increased public expenditure  through its effect on total transfers,  as a result of
backward  indexation  rules in a period of declining  inflation.
Real income  plays  an important  role in the fall  of public  expenditures  during  1987-1988.  This
is simply  the result of relatively  constant levels of real fiscal  spending  during a period of strong
growth.* 18-
It is noteworthy that fiscal  adjustment during the 1980s  was not accomplished  by the reduction
in public investment, a common practice in other Latin American countries. Adjustment in terms of
fiscal expenditure fell largely on public sector wages and transfers to the private sector.
Finally, table 2.8 rearranges and summarizes the information provided by tables 2.5 and 2.7.
It reports the net impact of dscal policy, macroeconomic,  and external variables on the non-financial
public sector deficit.
The sharp decrease in the 1973-75  public sector deficit is largely explained by fiscal policy
variables.  The more important policies were the increase in indirect and direct effective tax rates,
the decline in public employment, and the surge of the public enterprise surplus. As mentioned in
section 2.1, fiscal policy during these years was aimed to restore macroeconomic balances following
disequilibria during the Allende administration.
The 1976-81  period is characterized by a relatively  constant level of the deficit. However, the
results in table 2.8 suggest that this relative flatness results from two opposite forces.  On one side,
fiscal policy variables - effective tax rates, public sector real wages and the external public debt -
increase the public sector deficit.  Also, a decreasing inCfation  rate  - together  with a  backward
indexation scheme -pushes the deficit up.  On the other sice, a large increase in real income and the
rise of copper prices reduced the size of the deficit.
During 1982-86,  the source of an increasing deficit are fiscal policy variables: reduced direct
tax rates, declining number of affiliates to the state-run social security system, and the rising public
debt.  The change in these variables reflects the tax reform of 1982, the social security reform of
1980, and the government intervention in the economy after the debt crisis, respectively.
Finally, the 1987-88  recovery of the non-financial p-,.lic sector is associated with changes in
macroeconomic and external sector variables.  In particular, the surge in real income and copper
prices explain a decreasing public sector deficit. On the other side, fiscal policy  variables like indirect-19-
Table 2.7
Decomposition of Public Sector Expenditure
(Changes in Expenditure caused by their Determinants in
Percentage Point of GDP)
1974-75  1976-81  1982-86  1987-88
Purchases goods & servs.  0.2  -1.4  0.1  -0.3
Real Purchase  -0.3  0.2  0.0  0.1
Real income  0.5  1.7  -0.0  -0.4
Non-explained  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0
Wage Bill  -0.2  -0.5  -1.4  -1.2
Public Employment  4.3  -2.1  -0.1  0.0
Real wages  0.2  3.3  -1.5  0.4
Real income  1.2  -4.2  0.1  -0.9
Non-explained  2.7  2.4  -0.1  -0.6
Eoreien  Int. Payments  1.4  -1.8  0.9  -1.1
Debt Stock  1.7  2.8  2.9  2.5
Interest rate  -0.2  0.5  -0.5  0.2
Real income  0.1  -0.5  -0.1  -0.2
Exchange rate  0.6  -0.3  0.4  0.1
Non-explained  -0.8  -3.8  -1.9  -3.8
Domestic Paments  0.5  -0.3  1.1  -1;2
Debt stock  2.7  0.1
Interest rate  0.2  0.2
Real income  -0.1  0.8
Non-explained  -1.7  -2.4
ota  Transfr  2.6  3.8  -0.5  -1.5
Inflation  2.5  5.4  -0.1  0.1
Real income  0.2  -2.1  -0.6  -0.3
Non-Explained  0.1  0.5  0.2  -1.3
Public  In_es  j  -0.2  0.8  -0.3
Real investment  -0.8  -1.8  0.8  0.0
Real income  1.1  -1.5  0.0  -0.4
Non-Explained  -0.4  0.1  -0.1  0.0
Other  Expenditures  -3.5  -2.3  -0.9  -0.2
Total Expenditures  0.8  -5.7  -0.2  -4.3
l-20-
TABLE2.
SUMMARY OF PUBLIC SECTOR-DEF2CI  DECOMPOSITO-N
(Changes in Public Sector Deficits Compared by Groups of Determinants,
in Percentage Points of GDP)
1974-75  1976-81  1982-86  1987-88
Fiscal Policy Variables  -14.1  13.2  5.7  5.2
Indirect tax rate  -5.4  5.5  -2.4  1.8
Direct tax rate  -3.3  3.5  2.2  0.7
Copper tax rate  -1.8  0.0  0.0  -0.8
Public employment  -4.3  -2.1  -0.1  0.0
Affiliates soc. sec.  -0.1  1.8  1.1  2.4
Public investment  -0.8  -1.8  0.8  0.0
Public s. real wage  0.2  3.3  -1.5  0.4
Public external debt  1.7  2.8  2.9  0.5
Public domestic debt  2.7  0.1
Real purchases  -0.3  0.2  0.0  0.1
Macroeconomic Variables  4.7  -7.5  -2.8  -2.7
Real income  3.4  -10.8  -1.3  -2.9
Real exchange rate  -0.7  0.3  -1.2  0.0
Inflation rate  2.1  4.6  -0.1  0.1
Real wage  -0.1  -1.6  -0.4  -0.1
Domestic interest  0.2  0 2
External Seetor Variables  2.9  -1.8  0.8  -3.6
Copper price  3.1  -2.3  1.3  -3.9
External interest  -0.2  0.5  -0.5  0.3
Non-Decomposed Accounts
Public Enterprise Surplus  -8.4  0.4  -2.1  -0.7
(after transfers)
Other  Public S. Income  -4.2  0.6  2.0  0.1
Other Public S. Expenditure  -3.5  -2.3  -0.9  -0.2
Explained Deficit  -22.6  2.3  2.7  -1.9
Non-explained Deficit  4.1  4.7  -0.9  -3.9
Total Deficit  -18.5  -2.4  1.8  -5.8- 21 -
tax rates (a decrease in the VAT rate) and the continuing decline of affiliates to the social security
system had a negative impact on public finances during this period.
2.3  Ouasi-Fiscal Operations and Domestic Debt
An  essential feature  of  the  Chilean adjustment process after  1982 was the quasifiscal
operations to support a bankrupt financial system, in effect subsidizing  private debtors and financial
institutions.
Quasi-fiscal operations are carried out by central banks.  Nonetheless, they correspond to a
fiscal policy action  rather  than  a  purely monetary or  financial one.  Examples of  quasi-fiscal
operations are subsidized credits, exchange rate subsidies, free-of-charge guarantees given by the
Central Bank, or any other policy containing an element of subsidy to private sector agents.  The
nature of these operations often makes its estimation difficult. Moreover, the  accounting systems
utilized by central banks and general governments differ.  The Central Bank uses an accrual base
system whereas government transactions are registered on a cash basis. This feature complicates the
joint treatment of both institutions.
The main quasi-fiscal  programs developed by the Chilean Central Bank after the debt crisis
were:
1.  Credit to  Bankrupt Banks:  In 1981 the Central Bank offered emergency credits to eight
financial  institutions facing  insolvency. Later all these institutions went bankrupt and the total
amount of these credits turned into Central Bank losses.
2.  Purchase of Bad Loans:  The Central Bank acquired bad loans from the private banks, with
the latter's commitment to purchase back the bad portfolio in the future.  In this sense, the
Central Bank provided liquidity  to the financial  sector. However, the operation also involved
a subsidy  from the Central Bank as the credits were given at subsidized rates.- 22 -
3.  Preferential  Exchange  Rate: Private  external 'ebtors were allowed  to purchase  dollars  at a
subsidized  exchange  rate for servicing  their  debt,  after the massive  1982-83  devaluations  which
raised the domestic-currency  cost of foreign  debt service.
4.  Debt Rescheduling: The Central Bank rescheduled  domestic debts and financed this
operation through  loans  at negative  spreads.
5.  Exchange  Rate  Guarantees:  The Central Bank purchased foreign exchange with the
commitment  to sell it back after a year at the purchasing  exchange  rate adjusted by the
inflation rate.  In a period of an appreciating  real exchange  rate, the above operations
produced  losses  to the Central Bank.
6.  Foreign Exchange  Capital Losses: The acquisition  of private external debt pushed the
Central  Bank  into a net external  debtor position. Large  real  devaluations  during  ithe 1982-88
period caused  significant  capital  losses  to this institution.
Table  2.9 reports  estimated  losses  incurred  by the Central  Bank  due to quasi-fiscal  operations.
Losses  were estimated  as the present  value  -at December  1989  -of total Central  Bank  disbursements
minus  the economic  value  of the corresponding  assets.
The total estimated  loss  is about US$ 9.0 billion. This figure  represents  almost  40% of 1989
GDP. Its equivalent  cash-flow  is about US$ 540  million,  considering  an average  6% interest rate on
Central Bank liabilities.
The Central  Bank  financed  most  quasi-fiscal  operations  by issuing  domestic  debt. As a result,
its outstanding  domestic  debt increased  by US$ 5.7 billion during the  1982-89  period, while its
extemal debt increased  by US$ 4.0 billion.-23-
TABLE 2.9
CENTRAL BANK LOSSES ORIGINATED BY QUASI-FISCAL OPERATIONS
(US$ million, December 1989)
Qu5asi-Fiscal  Present Value  Estimated
Operation  of Disbursement  Asset Value  Net Loss
Credit to
Bankrupt Banks  1,930  0  1,930
Purchase of
Bad Loans  3,114  2,513  601
Preferential
Exchange Rate  3,320  0  3,320
Debt Rescheduling  1,570  1,180  390
Exchange  Rate Guarantee  1,585  0  1,585
Foreign Exchange
Capital Losses  1,227  0  1,227
TOTAL  12,746  3,693  9,053
Source:  Eyzaguirre and Larranaga (1990)- 24 -
In order to finance Central Bank losses,  the general govemment transferred to this institution
approximately USS 7.2 billion in Treasury bonds during 1983-86.  In this form, the government
recognized that the Central Bank was his financial agent during the debt crisis.
Nonetheless, the Central Bank exhibits a large cash-flow  deficit as shown in table 2.10. This
deficit is rooted in quasi-fiscal  operations and is not financed by the above mentioned fiscal transfers
to the extent that Treasury bonds in hands of Central Bank yield a (minimum) real return of 2%
while the average real interest on Central Bank liabilities  is 6%.
2.4  How Sustainable is the Deficit?
This sub-section analyzes two issues related to the sustainability  of public deficits. First, the
focus is on deficit financing under the fiscal policies carried out now in Chile.  Second, the issue of
public debt is addressed.
2.4.1  Fiscal Policy  and Deficit Sustainability  under the New Govemnment
The drastic structural reforms -as well as the deep stabilization programs - that allowed the
Chilean economy to start a dynarnic  growth path were undertaken under military rule.  On March
1990, a new president took over the government after having been elected by a  broad political
coalition. The new administration has stressed that the basic framework - a stabilized, free-market,
open  economy - will be preserved.  However, the new government has also stressed that  social
demands, largely postponed under the previous government, will strongly emerge.  Political stability
wculd require at least a partial satisfaction of these demands.
The relationship between political and economic stability is critical for the new government.
Fiscal policy is at the center stage.  On the one side, the satisfaction of social demands requires an
increase in govemment spending, particularly in education, health, housing, and social security. On-25 -
TABLE 2.10
ESTMAED  CENTRAL BANK DEFICIT
(As % of GDP)
Expenditure  2.95
Domestic Liabilities  1.66
External Liabilities  0.83
Dollar-Denominated Domestic Liabilities  0.48
Revenue  1.05
International Reserves  0.58
Loans to the Financial Sector  0.47
Treasury Bonds  0.43
Deficit  1.47
Source:  Eyzaguirre and Larranaga (1990)-26.
the other side, the financing of higher expenditure can be a delicate matter:  tax hikes are politically
resisted and can jeopardize investment and growth; debt financing is seriously limited given the
already large stock of public debt; and money financing is out of the question given the stabilization
commitment of  the  new government.  Anyhow, since the  end  of  1989 the  Central  Bank  is
autonomous so that the government would not have access to inflationary financing.
During its first four months in power, the new government obtained parliamentary approval
for a tax increase.  The new law established an increase in the VAT rate  from 16% to  18%, an
increase in the profit tax rate from 10% to 15% together with an expansion of the tax base, and a
rise in personal income taxes. An estimated additional US$600 million (2.3% of GDP) is expected
to be collected as a result of the tax reform.
Table 2.11 shows the estimated public sector budget for 1991. Calculations include the effect
of the tax reform and increased social expenditure.  Overall the non-financial public sector shows a
balanced budget.  However, the Central Bank estimated deficit would reach 1.5% of GDP.
Assuming  that macroeconomic  conditions do not change too much, the 1991  budget turns out
to be a good proxy for future public sector budgets as fiscal policy is expected to remain unchanged
at least until the next election year (1994). Hence the estimates from Table 2.11 focus our attention
on the financing of the Central Bank deficit.
The Central Bank deficit reflects the quasi-fiscal debt issue analyzed in the previous sub-
section.  As mentioned, the autonomous Central Bank can finance its deficit by printing money or
by issuing debt.
Along the  lines of Buiter (1988) we define a sustainable deficit level as one  that avoids
increasing debt/GDP  ratios over time.  Table  2.12 shows simulation results  for Central  Bank
debt/GDP ratios for different levels of monetary financing.-27-
TABLE 2.11
ESTlMATED 1991 PUBLIC SECTOR BUDGET
(% of GDP)
General Government
Current Revenue  24.7
Operatacnal  1.6
Social Security  1.9
Income Tax  3.8
Value-Adcded  Tax  8.9
Trade Taxes  3.0
Other Taxes  2.1
Copper Surplus  1.7
Other  Income  1.7
Current Expenditure  20.8
Wages  3.8
Purchases  Z6
Social Security  7.0
Transfers  5.3
Interest Payments  2.1
Saving  3.8
Investment  3.1
Other Capital Expenditure  0.7
Surplus  0.0




3.  Central Bank
Current Income  1.5
Domestic Assets  0.5
Extemal Assets  0.6
Current Extenditure  3.0
Domestic Uabilities  2.2
External LUabilities  0.8
Surplus  .1.5
Consolidated Total
Public Sector Srnslus  -1.5
Source  Budget Office and Table 2.10.-28-
As expected,  monetary  financing  -compromising  seignorage  and the inflation  tax -is a direct
function of GDP growth and the inflation  rate.  Total revenue for the Central Bank fluctuates
between 0.6% to 1.1%  of GDP depending  on the macroeconomic  scenario.
The Central Bank has to finance  the remaining  deficit  by issuing  domestic  debt. The initial
domestic  pubHic  debt/GDP  ratio is 30%o  and  the initial  total public  debt/GDP  ratio is 60%o.  Table  2.12
shows  what happens  to these ratios  after five  years  of debt-financed  (after-money-financed)  deficits. 3
The evolution  of debt/GDP ratios  depends  on two  factors. On one side, large revenue  from
monetary  finance  requires  a low  amount  of debt fnancing,  so that the debt/GDP  ratio  decreases  over
time. On the other side, high GDP growth  reduces the debt/GDP ratio. Total public  debt/GDP
ratios show  a more favorable  evolution  than domestic  public  debt/GDP  ratios as the former  include
external  Central Bank  debt, whose  path is given  exogenously.  The simulations  results  in Table  2.12
suggest  that the Central Bank defic,t - and hence the total public  sector deficits' - is sustainable
under reasonable  macroeconomic  conditions  as reflected  by declining  debt/output  ratios. However,
some difficulties  might arise from the fact that the deficit  is concentrated  in the Central Bank. In
particular,  the autonomous  character of this institution  could be jeopardized  if the Central Bank
depends  on the government  to finance  its deficit.
2.4.2  Public  Debt and the Sustainability  of Deficits
Apart from financing  social expenditures,  public  finances  will  be stressed  by the large levcl
of public  debt. Total public  debt increased  from US$7.9  billion  in 1981  to more than US$22  billion
-Table  2.12  simulations  are computed  assuming  constant  real interest rates.
'Recall from Table 2.11  that the estimated  1991  deficit is entirely  concentrated  in the Central
Bank.-29-
in 1989. ITis figure includes both domestic and external debt, held by the financial and non-Ginancial
public sector. The steep increase in public debt reflects the government intervention in the economy
after the debt crisis.
Leaving aside public firms and the large state bank (Banco del Estado), an estimation of the
net public debt of the consolidated general government and Central Bank is about 60% of GDP.
To illustrate the implications of public debt for public finances, let's start with the public
sector budget constraint.  If the public deficit is financed through monetarv creation and issuance of
domestic and foreign public debt, financing of the primary deficit, as a fraction of GDP (d), can be
expressed as:
(2.4)  d=mh  +m(i +n)  +b6+b*  -b(r-n)  -b*(r*-n+ p)
where  a  is the inflation rate, n is the GDP growth rate, r is the real interest rate paid on domestic
debt,  r  is the  real  interest  paid on  foreign debt, and /u is the rate  of real  devaluation.'  The
outstanding stocks of base money,  domestic public debt, and external public debt - as shares of GDP -
are denoted by m, b, and b*; respectively. A dot over a variable denotes the time derivative.
Table  2.13 shows simulations results  for  primary public surplus levels required  for  (i)
maintaining a constant debt/GDP ratio, and (ii) decreasing this ratio by S percentage points of GDP
per year.
A clear implication from Table 2.13 is that the large public debt outstanding makes public
finances highly sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations. Under an optimistic scenario, with output
5'be  real domestic (foreign) interest rate r (r*) is defined as the difference between the
nominal domestic (foreign) interest rate and domestic (foreign) inflation, and the rate of real
devaluation is defined as the rate of increase of the nominal exchange rate plus foreign inflation
minus domestic inflation.-30 -
growing at 5% and interest rates at 6%, the public sector can maintain its debt ratio by running a
0.8% of GDP deficit. Alternatively, it may reduce significantly  the debt/GDP ratio by 5 percentage
points of GDP, running a primary surplus of 3.6% of GDP.  However, in a bad year with 2% growth
and  10% interest  rates, the  public sectcr would have to generate  a primary surplus of 4.2% to
maintain constant the debt/GDP ratio, required to jump to 8.6% of GDP if this ratio were to be
lowered by 5%.
TABLE 2.12
CENTRAL BANK DEFICIT FINANCING AND DEBT/GDP RATIOS 6
Inflation Rate:  15%
GDP Growth:  2%  5%  7%
Monetary Financing  0.6  0.7  0.8
(% of GDP)
Domestic Debt/GDP  32.1  27.2  24.4
Total Debt/GDP  59.2  50.1  45.8
Inflation Rate:  30%
GDP Growth:  2%  5%  7%
Monetary Financing  0.9  1.0  1.1
(% of GDP)
Domestic Debt/GDP  30.4  25.8  23.1
Total Debt/GDP  57.6  49.4  44.4
6Debt/GDP ratios are shown for year 5 of deficit financing, starting at levels of 30% for
domestic debt and 60% for total public debt at year 0.* 31 -
TABLE 2.13
P!RIMARYPUBLIC SURPLUSES UNDER ALTERNAITIVEPUBLIC DEBT:  PATHS
Real  Primary
Interest  GDP  Surplus
Rate  Growth  (% of GDP)
(%)  (%)
(i)  Constant Public DebtGDP
Scenario:
Optimistic  6.0  5.0  -0.8
Pessimistic  10.0  2.0  3.6
(ii)  Decreasing Public Debt/GDP by 5% Per Year
Scenario:
Optimistic  6.0  5.0  4.2
Pessimistic  10.0  2.0  8.6
Note: Simulations assume an inflation rate of 15%, a constant real exchange rate, and equal domestic
and extemal real interest rates.  Base values correspond to 1987.- 32 -
3.  DEFICIT FINANCING, INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION
This section develops a model for assessing  the inflation and interest rate effects of alternative
strategies of fimancing  public sector deficits.
The past years have witnessed a revival of interest in the relation between fiscal deficits and
macroeconomic variables. The growing literature on fiscal deficits has dealt with a variety of issues
such as the relation between fiscal deficits and economic growth, the sensitivity of macroeconomic
variables to changes in the public sector budget and the channels through which fiscal deficits are
transmitted to the rest of the economy. This literature emphasizes the implications  of the increased
reliance on  domestic financing of  public deficits as a  result of  the sharp  reduction  in extemal
financing to most high-debt countries 7.
In  this  section  a  framework is proposed  for  analyzing empirically the  macroeconomic
consequences of alternative strategies of domestic financing. The model introduces modifications  to
the framework proposed in Easterly (1989) along a model developed by Mujica (1990) in order to
capture specific features of the Chilean economic experience during the 1980s 8.
The  rest  of  this section is organized as follows.  Subsection 3.1 provides the empirical
background for the issues discussed in this section.  Subsection 3.2 presents the basic structure of a
model that relates explicitly the means of domestic financing to the behavior of interest rates and
inflation. In subsection 3.3 we estimate asset demand equations and reduced-form equations for the
nominal interest rate and the price level. Fmally,  subsection 3.4 discusses  some simulation exercises
for alternative deficit financing policies.
'Evidence of this interest is reflected in Buiter (1988), van Wijnbergen (1988) and Dornbusch
(1984,1987).
'For a reference on the Chilean experience in the 1980s  see Corbo (1985,1989), Edwards and
Edwards (1987), Ffrench-Davis and de Gregorio (1987) and Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel (1988).- 33-
3.1 The Stylized Facts
A brief review of the policies and evidence carried out in Chile during the 1980s from the
perspective of their effects on interest and inflation rates will help to introduce this section.  The
stylized facts are depicted in Figures 3.1 - 3.4.  Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the short-run
nominal interest rate (30 days) using quarterly data for the 1975.1-1988.IV  period. Figure 3.2 depicts
the evolution of the 30 - day inflation rate for the  1975.11-1988.IV  period.  Figures 3.3 and 3.4
summarize the evolution of money and domestic public debt (as percentages of GDP) for the 1976.1-
1988.IV and 1983.I-1988.IV  periods, respectively.
Comparing figures 3.1 and 3.2, a similar time pattern emerges for both the interest and the
inflation rate during two distinct periods. In the first period, from 1975.1  through 1978.IV,  both rates
decline systematically. In the second period, from 1979.! through 1988.IV,  the two rates remained
stable with the exception of a sharp upward jump in the fourth quarter of 1982.
The  relative stability of interest  rates and  prices in Chile during the  1980s -- by Latin
American standards - contrasts with the erratic behavior of money and particularly with the upward
trend of the stock of domestic public debt.  Figure 3.3 illustrates the significant changes of Ml
velocity of circulation: M1 as a share of GDP ranged between 13% and 31%.  Demand for real M1
as measured by its velocity of circulation peaks in the first quarter of 1983 and thereafter starts a
downward trend.  Between 1983.1  and 1987.IV  Chile's real balances -- as a percentage of GDP --
decreased by 12%.  Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of the domestic public debt as a share of GDP.
From a stable low level of around 10% before the debt crisis  in 1982,  public  debt rises sharply to 80%
of GDP in 1983.1,  starting an upward trend until 1986.IV.
As many other countries in Latin America, Chile faced in the early 1980s  an adverse external
environment which triggered a crisis of vast proportions forcing major adjustments in macro policy,
particularly in the management of fiscal deficits.  However, what seems to be of particular interest- 34 -
in the Chilean case is that the sharp decline in extemal financing  was preceded by the implementation
of a set of economic reforms aimed at increasing  the role of market mechanisms  and reducing existing
barriers to international trade and capital movements. As discussed  in Section 2, the reduction in the
government's role in economic activity  was the main factor behind the sequence of surpluses in the
public sector budget before the debt crisis in 1982. As a result of these policies, the government was
able to finance the deterioration  in the public sector budget after the debt crisis in 1982 without
destabilizing the economy. On the other hand, a social security reform implemented during the same
period and the management of the debt crisis modified drastically  the nature of the effects associated
with a change in the public sector budget.  In the first place, the reform implemented in the social
security system had strong fiscal  consequences and was related with an increase in private saving, part
of which was transferred to the public sector as domestic public debt issues. Second, as a result of
the debt crisis and the overexpansion of domestic credit the financial system was in a very fragile
position. In order to avoid the breakdown of the financial system, the Central Bank provided credit
to the private sector at subsidized rates.  ITis subsidy accounted for the quasi-fiscal content of the
credit policy and implied a financial  transfer from the public sector to private corporations. Both the
social security reform and the quasi-fiscal  operations of the Central Bank must be-  considered in any
attempt to explain the inflation and interest effects related to changes in fiscal  deficits. The empirical
modei presented  in  this section will emphasize these specific features of  the  fiscal adjustment
undertaken in Chile.FIGURE 3.1  NOMINAL  INTEREST RATE
(  1975.1  - 1988.4  )
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3.2  Public pefinai  nvate  Sector Portfolio
The point of departure of the model is the basic government financing identity, which may
be stated by rewriting (2.4) as an equation for the nominal total consolidated public sector deficit:
(3.1)  G  + i  +  +  e
where G, De, D, H, i, i' and e are respectively the primary deficit, the stock of foreign public debt,
the stock of domestic public debt, the stock of high-powered money, the domestic nominal interest
rate, the foreign nominal interest rate, and the nominal exchange rate.
The government budget identity states that the total public deficit consisting  of the primary
deficit plus foreign and domestic interest payments must be  financed by changes in foreign and
domestic public liability holdings. However, since for most developing countries after 1982 external
borrowing was quasi-exogenous, an increase in the primary deficit must be basically financed by
issuing  bonds or by creating high-powered  money. Therefore, the model will  emphasize the trade-off
associated with the choice between money  and domestic debt financing  for given levels of the primary
deficit and foreign financing. This choice has serious implications for both real and nominal variables.
Hence the focus in this section will be on inflation and interest rates.
Consider a small open  economy that faces an exogenous flow of external credit.  In each
period individuals  allocate their wealth, which is fixed at any point in time, among three broad assets:
domestic money, public sector bonds and interest bearing foreign assets.  The long-run portfolio
demands for  these  three  assets  are  given by the  following expressions:
dm  -p,  =  a+  al  y,  +  2  It  + a  (it  +  J  +  W
3a  <>O  a20  U3 O-40-
(3.3)  dd  - Pt  =  p  P  I Y,  +  P2S  +  pP(i'  +  8)  +  W
P&<  02>  P3<O
(3.4)  e,  + m,  =  'go + 'V Y, + T2 it  +  TP1i  +  8,)  + WI
VI<>  T2<0  V3>O
where w is real financial  wealth,  y is domestic  real output, p is the domestic  price level,  i is the
domestic  nominal  interest rate, i  is the foreign  nominal  interest rate, m is the domestic  nominal
money supply, m  is foreign nominal  asset holdings,  d is public sector bonds, e is the nominal
exchange  rate, and 6 is the expected  rate of change  of the exchange  rate. All variables,  except  i, i
and 6, are expressed  in natural logarithms. The subscript  t refers to time and the superscript  d
denotes demand. Expected  coefficient  sigps  are denoted below  each equation.
Equations  (3.2)  - (3.4)  specify  long-run  portfolio  demands  - as a fraction  of real wealth  - as
depending  on domestic  real output, the domestic  interest rate and the foreign  interest rate adjusted
by the expected  rate of change  of nominal  exchange  rate depreciation. Total wealth  is given  by  the
sum  of the three asset  holdings.  Equations  (3.2)  -(3.4)  assume  implicitly  unit elasticities  with  respect
to wealth. A more general form would  allow  for non-unit  wealth  elasticities.
The wealth  adding-up  constraint  implies  that only two of the three demand equations  are
independent  and therefore from  now  on we will  focus  on the equilibrium  conditions  in the domestic
money  and public  sector bonds  markets.
Let's focus  now  on the nature of short-run  stock  adjustment  for the holdings  of real balances
and domestic  public  debt. Assuming  a partial  adjustment  mechanism  due to the existence  of implicit- 41 -
adjustment costs, the change in the stock of real balances and real public bonds holdings can be
written as:
(3.5)  (m,-ps)  a[(m,d-p,)  - (m  _  -p,.)]  +  OS
O<as1  6'O
(3.6)  (dt-P)  =  F[(d,d-p)  - (d  -P,-1)1 + flkg
O<Ps<l  ani
where the dot over a variable denotes a first-difference operator.  These two equations represent the
short-run equilibrium conditions in both the money and the public bonds markets.  Naturally, the
adding-up constraint requires that the foreign asset flow demand is a negative function of the right-
hand variables included in equations (3.5)-(3.6).
Equation (3.5) suggests that a change in the determinants of the long-run demand for real
balances would lead in the current period to a change in the stock of real balances which is a fraction
of the difference between actual and lagged real money balances. In addition equation (3.5) includes
a nominal money supply shock term (S) defined as the difference between the actual and expected
rate  of change in nominal money balances.  This term captures  the shock-absorber hypothesis
proposed by Carr and Darby (1981), which states that when the government changes the rate  at
which  it creates  money, it causes a  net  unplanned increase  in money holdings by individuals.
Alternative uses of money are not found instantly, so money holdings will temporarily exceed desired
levels.9
'Empirical studies for the Chilean economy that include a partial adjustment mechanism in the
short-run demand for real balances are Acevedo and Vial (1979) and Matte and Rojas (1986).
For studies that include a money supply shock term see Larrafn and Larrafn (1988) and Corbo
(1982).-42-
As in the case of the,  money  market, a partial adjustment mechanism  is assumed in the market
for public bonds.  Equation (3.6) also includes the actual rate of change in the stock of nominal
public debt in tbe determination of the evolution over time of the level of real public bonds.  This
term makes explicit  the effects of the increase in private saving and the transfer of resources to the
private sector implied  by the social  security reform and the quasi-fiscal  operations of the Central Bank
in Chile after the debt crisis.  Equation (3.6) suggests that a higher rate of the supply of nominal
public bonds would increase the rate of change in real bonds holdings as a result of the positive
correlation between the stock of public debt and private saving. This partial demand accommodation
to supply shocks implies that the interest rate will not rise by as much it would increase in the
absence of demand accommodation.
Substituting equations (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.5) and (3.6) and solving for the current values
of real balances and real public bonds holdings we obtain the following  equations:
(3.7)  m,  t  =  ¢  +  fIYt +  2it  +  3(i  +  )  + *4(m,1i-p,_)
+ *sSt + ¢6w,
(3.8)  d,  - pt  =  'O  +  ¢sy,  +  02i,  +  ' 3(i1  +.8)  +  'N(dt  P-l'
*- 0  S,  + 0 6 W,
where the new +, and G3  coefficients are non-linear combinations of the structural coefficients of
equations (3.2) - (3.6), as detined in Appendix 1.
Since the  nominal stock of money and  the  nominal stock  of domestic public debt  are
determined by the government budget equation (3.4) and real wealth is exogenous, equations (3.7)
and (3.8) describe an adjustment mechanism for domestic prices and interest rates.  Inverting these
equations we can derive the reduced-form equations for the nominal interest rate and the price level.-43  -
(3.9)  l,  +  a  lyg +  02(4'+8,)  +  a  (.-1-PS-1)  +  4(d, l-P, l)
+  +  )6d  + Cv 7dg 1 + D4S  +  Qgw,
(3-10)  P,  =  Wo  +  1lyC  +  A201*+t)  +  %3(M-1-A-1)  +  "09-PI  l
+  asst  +  6dg +  UA-,  +  ugS,  + aqw,
where the new Q and a  coefficients are also defined in Appendix 1.
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) are quite general as they do not only incorporate open and closed
economy features but also allow  for the possibility  of distinguishing  between short and long-run effect
of shocks in the money and public bond markets.
In addition, the reduced-form equations make explicit the nature of the trade-offs associated
to alternative strategies of domestic financing.
Table 3.1  summarizes  the short and long-run effects of money and bond financed fiscal  deficits
on the interest rate and the price level.  While the short-run effects of debt-financed deficits are
ambiguous, long-run effects are positive.  On the other side, short and long-run effects of money-
financed deficits reduce the interest rate and raise inflation.
3.3 Empirical Results
This subsection presents the results obtained from the estimation of the short-run demands
for real balances and real public debt (equations (3.7) and (3.8)), based on quarterly data for the
Chilean economy.'°  We also estimated the reduced-form equations for the interest  rate and the
price level (equations (3.9) and (3.10)) in order to assess the ability  of the model to describe directly
the inflation and interest rate paths.
'"lbe sample period for the money equation is 1976.1  - 1988.1V,  while for the domestic debt
equation it covers 1982.1  - 1988.IV.-44-
3.3.1 Asset Demands
The estimated  portfolio  asset demands  correspond  to equations  (3.7)  and (3.8),  amended  by
including  exponential  time trends,  as reflected  by the first lines  of tabies 3.3 and 3.4.
The estimates  of the money  demand  equation  are reported in Table  3.2. All  coefficients  have
expected  signs  and almost  all are significant  at conventional  levels. In particular,  the significance  of
the coefficients  of the unexpected  nominal  monetary  shock  (S,) and the lagged  dependent  variable
(m,. 1-p,.,)  indicates  that real balances  have  been highly  sensitive  to money  supply  shocks  and that the
effect  of a particular  variable  on real balance  holdings  is  spread  out over a significant  period. Finally,
the negative  coefficient  of the time  variable  may  be related  to changes  in asset  demands  of individuals
and businesses,  arising  from the strong  financial  innovations  introduced  between the mid-1970s  and
end-1980s.  As  a whole,  these  results  are quite consistent  with  the process  of stock  adjustment  implied
by the model and suggest that conventional  money demand models cannot give a  consistent
explanation  of the behavior  of real balances  during  this period in Chile.
Table 3.3  presents  the estimates  for the short-run  public  debt demand  of equation  (3.8). The
results  obtained  are very  satisfactory  in terms  of the overall  fit and quite consistent  with some  of the
hypotheses  advanced  earlier. For example, lagged  real public bonds holdings  turned out to be
significantly  positive,  suggesting  that if this factor is ignored  a crucial  element  is left out of the story.
On the other hand,  since  the coefficient  of the actual  rate of change  in the stock of nominal  public
debt was not significant  in preliminary  regressions,  the results  in Table 3.3 report
the estimates  of equation  (3.8)  without  this variable.
Another interesting  result emerges comparing  the relative size of the interest rate semi-
elasticities  of money  and public  bond holdings  and the speed  of adjustment  in the money  and public
bond markets. Ihe  estimates  imply  a larger impact  on inflation  when fiscal  deficits are money-
financed  rather than debt-financed.,45.
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3.3.2  Reduced-Form Equations for Interest Rates and Prices
In order to assess the ability  of the model to explain directly  the behavior of interest rates and
prices, we estimated their reduced-form equations for a 1983.1-1988.IV  sample.
Table 3.4 reports  the estimated coefficients for both the interest rate and the price level
equations (3.9) and (3.10). The results are quite consistent with the hypothesis implied by the model
and with the results obtained from the estimation of the structural equations (3.7) and (3.8).  All
variables with an unambiguous effect on the interest rate and the price level present the expected
signs. The only exception is lagged real public bond holdings, which has the wrong sign in both the
interest rate and the price level equations, but is not significant. This result can be explained  in terms
of the values of the estimated coefficients of the structural equations.  For a high value of the
coefficient related  to the  adjustment speed  in the  public bonds market (u) -- which is the case
according to our estimations -- the model implies  small values  for the coefficients of lagged real public
bonds in the reduced-form equations (see Appendix 1).  In addition, for those variables with en
ambiguous effect in the reduced-form equations, the signs of the estimated coefficients coincide in
all cases with the signs implied by the values obtained from the structural equations.
On the other hand, the overall fit for both the price level and the interest rate equations is
quite  satisfactory, in  particular  for  a  period  dominated  by  frequent  changes  in  government
interventions and private expectations.  The results also tend to confirm the hypothesis, implicit in
the model, that the nominal interest rate and the price level have been sensitive to both foreign and
domestic influences.
An interesting result concerns the effect of lagged real balances in the interest rate equation.
As opposed to Edwards (1988) findings,  here is clear evidence of a positive relationship between the
interest rate and lagged real balances.- 47  -
TABLE 3.2
ETMMTION  RESULT  EOR ThE  1'OM  DEMAND
(1976.1 - 1988.1V )
mt - P  '  +  OLy, +  02,  +  03(it+6)  +  0 4(mt.I-P,.1)  +  OsS,  +  r 1TME
OLS  ARI  NLS
00  -1.582  -1.959
(1.3)  (1.5)
,  Q0.415  0.486
(3.5)  (3.9)
02  -3.101  -3.595
(4.1)  (4.6)
03  -0.165  -0.102
(0.9)  (0.6)
904  0.702  0.660
(15.2)  (12.6)
t5  0.148  0.151
(3.5)  (4-1)
r  4-0.004  -0.004
(4.1)  (4.0)
cr  0.298  0.340
a1 1.390  1.430  1.394
a2 -10.410  -10.590  -10.414
a3 -0.550  -0.300  -0.555
A2 0.972  0.979  0.972
h  1.947  0.570  1.947
rho  0.285
Note:  t-values are in parenthesis. h is Durbin's h and rho is the residual  first-order  correlation
coefficient. The estimation methods were: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  Maximum
Likelihood  for ARI residuals  (ARI), and Nonlinear  Least Squares  (NLS).-48-
TABLED3.3
ESTIMATION  RESULTS  FOR  THE PUBLIC  DEBT  DEMAND
(1983.1  - 1988.)
d-  -P,  =  00+  Ot,  +  OA + 03(i,+6j  +  . 4(dt.%-pl.,)+  o4 + r2TIME
OLS  AR1  NLS
00  55.005  S1.932
(3.8)  (3.7)
4,  -4.249  -3.956
(3.3)  (3.2)
102  19.024  19.175
(2.6)  (2.7)
03  -2.816  -2.820
(2.1)  (2.1)
04  0.305  0.281
(4.6)  (4.2)
41$
T2  Q.081  -0.082
(4.5)  (4.4)
p  0.695  0.719
BS  -6.115  -5.502  -6.117
B 2 2730  26.668  27.381
B 3 4.052  -3.922  -4.054
0.872  0.816  0.872
h  0.375  0.570
rho  0.285
NgW: see table 3.2.-49-
TABILE  3.4
REDUCED-FORM  ESIATON  RfESULTS  FOR THE INTEREST
RATE AND THE PRIE3EEL




CONSTANT  -1.170  -8.810
(2.5)  (1.3)
y,  0.084  0.170
(1.9)  (0.3)






m,  0.014  0.514
(1.9)  (2.0)
ci,  0.004  0.182
(0.5)  (1.6)
S,  0.0039  -0.068
(0.5)  (0.6)
i  Q0.757  0.977
DW  1.720  1.500
NVote:  t-values in parenthesis.  DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic.-50-
3.4 Simulation Resulta
The results reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 were used to simulate the impact of inflation on
seignorage revenue and the effects on the interest rate and the price level of a change in the fiscal
deficit under alternative strategies of domestic financing. In the simulation exercises that follow  we
used the multipliers summarized in Table 3.1 and the estimated coefficients of the first columns of
Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
3.4.1 Inflation and the Inflation Tax
Figure 3.5 shows the steady state relationship between inflation rates and the inflation tax
revenue derived from our estimated coefficients of the money demand equation and assuming no
growth in the exogenous variables.  The revenue-maximizing  monthly inflation rate is 20%, which
yields an inflation tax revenue of about 2% of GDP. Little tax gain is obtained from raising inflation.
At an inflation rate of 2% per month the revenue is about 0.5% of GDP.  Raising the inflatioui  rate
from 2% to 20% per month, inc:eases seignorage revenue by only 1.5% percentage points of GDP.
3.4.2 Effects of a 100% Increase in the Fiscal Deficit
To simulate the effects of a one-period increase in the public sector deficit we have assumed
that before the fiscal shock occurs the economy is at a steady-state equilibrium, with a 1% of GDP
deficit and a 0.2 money/GDP ratio."
Table 3.5 summarizes the magnitude of the short and long-run effects of a money-financed,
transitory 100% rise in the fiscal deficit. The  Sal  shock results in a fall in the interest rate by 0.39
percentage points in the first period and a long run decline of about 0.27 percentage points.  The
effect of the fiscal shock on the price level is of about 7% both in the short run and long run.  This
" Recall that flow variables, such as GDP, are quarterly figures.- 51  a
exercise suggests that the main effect of a change in the deficit financed by money creation is in the
first period. In addition, since the increase in the price level never matches the increase in the stock
of money required to finance the fiscal shock, this simulation suggests that money has real effects.
The dynamic  behavior of the interest rate and the price level after a money-financed 100% increase
in the fiscal deficit are shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
Let's consider now the case of a 100% increase in the fiscal  deficit financed by issuing public
bonds.  In this case, the fiscal shock requires only a 2% increase in the stock of public debt.  The
short and long-run effects are reported in Table 3.6.  The results indicate that the increase in the
fiscal deficit will induce a slight increase in the interest rate and the price level. Because the interest
rate rises, the rise in inflation required to maintain the portfolio Nquilibrium  is much lower than under
the money-financed deficit.  The dynamic behavior of the interest rate and the price level after a
bond-financed fiscal shock are depicted in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 respectively.
In summary,  these results suggest that the main impact of a change in the fiscal deficit occurs
in the first quarter.  The only exception is the gradual rise in prices when the fiscal  deficit is financed
by domestic borrowing. In addition, the exercises show a small impact on interest rates and prices
of a debt-financed deficit.  This result reflects the specific features of the sample period of our
estimates.  In particular, the transfer payments to the private sector implied by the social security
reform and the quasi-fiscal  operations are the main factors behind the small impact of debt-financed
fiscal deficits on interest rates and prices.-52  -
TABLE  3.5
BEE3  OEM-ONEY-FINANCED INC-REASE  IN kISCAL DEF!CIT
SHORT RUN  LONG RUN
Change in Interest Rate  -0.385  -0.265
(Percentage Points)
Change in Price Level  7.326  7.245
(100  d log p)
TABLE 3.6
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC DEBT-FINANCED INCREASE IN FISCAL DEFICIT
SHORT RUN  LONG RUN
Change in Interest Rate  0.090  0.053
(Percentage Points)
Change in Price Level  0.280  0.551
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4.  PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
This section goes a step further in analyzing  the macroeconomic  implications  of public sector
deficits by assessing the impact of the public sector on private sector spending in Chile.  Thereforc
the focus is on the sensitivity of private consumption and investment to fiscal variables, in addition
to indirect effects of them via interest rates, inflation or private disposable income.  How private
saving arid capital formation are affected by fiscal policies has significant  implications for both short-
term stabilization issues and long-run growth prospects.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the evolution of the private consumption to  private disposable
income ratio and the private investment to GDP ratio during the last three decades.
Not surprisingly,  private consumption has tended to be counter-cyclical,  i.e. consumption does
not decline as strongly as private disposable income during recessions, such as those of 1975 and
1982-1983.  Two high consumption episodes coincided  with the fiscal-monetary  expansion of the early
seventies and the foreign-financed private spending boom of 10 years later.  A distinct structural
change takes place after  1984:  private consumption as a ratio of disposable income reaches the
lowest values in three  decades, and stays there throughout the  1985-1988  recovery - an important
counterpart to the significant current account adjustment which took place in the 1980s.
The private investment rate shows wild swings  during the 1960-1988  period in Chile.  After
a historical decline to 5% of GDP during the early 1970s,  it starts a continuous recovery, to boom
in the early 1980s. Then private capital formation took a dive coincident with the 1982-83  recession
and subsequent policy uncertainty.  Investment remained low in 1984-1986  before picking up again
in 1987  and 1988. It is estimated that the private investment rate could surpass 16% of GTOP  in 1990.- 59 -
4.1  Private Conumpt
This subsection, significantly  based on a framework  developed by Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1991), addresses  the effects of public policies on consumption in Chile.
Direct effects of fiscal policies on consumption or saving operate  through public saving (or
the deficit) and its composition.  If the stringent conditions required for Ricardian equivalence are
satisfied, a rise in public saving, if it is done via lower public spending, is exactly  offset by an increase
in consumption. As disposable income does not change, the reduction in private saving matches the
increase in public saving.  A rise in public saving does no affect consumption at all if it is made
possible via higher taxes. But as disposable income is reduced by the size of the tax, the reduction
in private saving also matches the  increase in public saving (the  latter being macroeconomically
equivalent to issuing more public debt).  The opposite results are predicted by the Keynesian (and
permanent income without Ricardian equivalence) hypotheses: current (permanent) taxes matter for
consumption, not current (permanent) public spending levels.
The Ricardian hypothesis has been widely rejected in  empirical studies for industrialized
countries. Most of these studies identify the existence of pervasive borrowing constraints as the main
cause for its rejection.'  A study for a set of developing countries by Montiel and Haque (1987)
tests for two different causes which could explain a deviation from Ricardian equivalence: higher
private than govemment discount rates (due to Blanchard-Yaari infinite-lived households facing a
mortality probability) and liquidity  constraints.  They find significant  evidence for the latter causing
a deviation from Ricardian equivalence without much support for the former.
'For  Ricardian equivalence to hold, the main conditions to be satisfied jointly are: absence of
liquidity constraints, equal rates of discount for the public and private sectors, and certainty on
future income, tax and public sector expenditure flows. For a further discussion  of these
conditions and surveys  of empirical studies see Hayashi (1985), Hubbard and Judd (1986),
Bemheim (1987), and Leiderman and Blejer (1989).FIGURE  4.1
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Borrowing constraints, proxied by current  income  or  financial asset  holdings, are  also  major
determinants in the cross-developing  country studies for private consumption and household saving
by Rossi (1989) and Schmidt-Hebbel,  Webb and Corsetti (1991), respectively.
Indirect effects of public (fiscal-monetary)  policies on consumption operate via the impact of
public deficits and their financing on major prices affecting private consumption: real interest rates,
inflation, and the real exchange rate.  Real interest rates affect private consumption only if the well-
known substitution, income and wealth effects do not cancel each other.  This seems not to be the
case, judging from the growing  evidence which  shows that consumption is not sensitive  to real interest
rates.'  While inflation's first order effect is on the composition of the savings stock and not on
saving or consumption flows, it may have second-order effects reducing saving if it is associated to
capital flight or increasing (precautionary) saving if it raises uncertainty.  An expected devaluation
reduces the consumption-based real interest rate and leads to capital flight - the first effect could
increase actual consumption while capital flight raises the measured consumption to income ratio if
capital flight reduces measured income." 4
Substitution  effects  from  fiscal policies could arise  when  fiscal spending  on  privately
appropriated services  (education, health, nutrition) and direct transfers to households reduce the necd
for  private consumption expenditure on  these categories, hence  leading to  possible declines in
aggregate private consumption (see Easterly et al., 1989).
'3Among the studies on the interest-insensitivity  of saving in developing countries see, for
instance, Giovannini (1985), Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), and Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb and
Corsetti (1991).  For an alternate view, see Fry (1988) and Balassa (1989).
"For the theory and the Latin American experience on the role of consumption-based real
mterest rates on intertemporal consumption allocation see Dornbusch (1983, 1985), and for the
relation between saving and capital flight see Dornbusch (1989).- 63 
Monetary policy and financial reform affect tbe aggregate of mor:tmry and quasi -n.oetary
assets. Higher holdings of broad money tend to increase consumption foi two reasons: first they are
a major component of private financial wealth and second they tend to reduce the incidence of
bfrrowing  constraints faced by at  least  a  subgroup of  consumers.  Another  form of  liquidity
constraints are those imposed by foreign lenders.  Particularly after  1982 foreign saving tends to
reflect the foreign resource constraint imposed  by foreign lenders and not the excess of income over
unconstrained domestic absorption.
Let's start the discussion  of a relevant framework for assess;ng  the impact of public policies
on private consumption by referring to a standard linear form for testing the Ricardian equivalence
proposition, based on Bernheim's (1987) survey:
(4.1)  Cp, =  ao + a,  (YN, - T, + i, D,) + a2 (T, - EG,  - i, D,) +
+ a4 D,  + as W, +  va
where Cp is private consumption, YN is national income, T is tax revenue net of transfers and
subsidies to the private sector, i is the nominal interest rate, D is government (domestic) debt, EG  is
public spending, W is private wealth, and v2 is a stochastic error term.  Hence the first right-hand
determinant is private disposable income and the second is the nominal or total government surplus.
Three simple null hypotheses can be tested with this specification:
(i)  Keynesian hypothesis: ao > 0, a 1 >  0, other coefficients 0;
(ii)  Permanent income hypothesis without Ricardian equivalence:
a4 > 0, a5 > 0, other coefficients 0;
(iii)  Ricardian equivalence: a,  = a2 > 0, other coefficients equal to 0.-64-
However,  the specification  in equation 4.1 presents various  shortcomings.,, Frst,  public
saving  and not the public  surplus  should  be the relevant  determinant  in 4.2,  because  public  investment
adds to real capital  and therefore constitutes  'net wealth' (Barro, 1974). Under inflation,  only the
real component  of domestic  interest payments  should  enter both the private  disposable  income  and
the government  surplus (saving)'. Tbird, permanent,  not current private disposable  income and
public surplus (saving)  should enter equation (4.1) for a fair test of the Ricardian  proposition.
Finally,  additional  potential  consumption  determinants,  such as foreign  payments,  the real interest
rate or inflation,  should  be included.
The following  specification  for the private consumption  to private  disposable  income ratio
takes  care of the above  mentioned  shortcomings.  In addition,  the scaling  of non-stationary  variables
to private disposable  income  reduces  the incidence  of non-stationarity  problems:
'42'  C  PDY  P
4.2)  DY  =Po  +  P 1 DYp  +  P2  Ps  |  P3 rc  +  P4g  a  +  1 55p  +
''  DYptDp  DYppe
+a  m  + P,  He  +  P  FS  V
- DY  +t  7DYw  DYz
where DYP  is current private  disposable  income,  PDYp  is permanent  private  disposable  income,  PS,
is permanent  public  saving,  r. is  the consumption-based  real interest  rate, x, is  consumption  inflation,
P.  and P.  are prices  for imported  and national  private  consumption  goods,  respectively,  CPTR is
15Bernheim  (1987)  addresses  the third and fourth limitations  discussed  below.
"Tbe inflation  component  of interest payments  on the public  debt, which  compeisates  for the
loss in principal  due to inflation,  is put back into public  bond holdings  by private investors  aiming
at maintaining  constant real holdings  of public  debL-65  -
the sum of public expenditure on privately appropriated services and direct transfers to consumers,
H is base money, FS is foreign saving, and v is a stochastic error term.
Again, B, 01,  and B2  are associated to the corresponding Keynesian, permanent-income and
Ricardian hypotheses.  Note, however, that I2 could be positive due to a financial market structure
giving preferential access to bank credit to the public sector and hence allocating the residual to
private consumption (and investment). This direct form of crowding out of private saving by public
sector saving behavior has obviously nothing to do with Ricardian unconstrained, forward-looking
private consumers internalizing the govemment's intertemporal budget constraint.
Expected signs of the coefficients are the following:  130,0,  a2,  a%,  Ba  > 0; B6  < 0; B3,  84, 55  <  >
0.
Permanent private disposable income and permanent public saving are consistent with the
following  definitions for their corresponding current values:
(4.3)  DYp  E  GDP, - NFp,  - T, + r, D,
(4.4)  SGt  T, - CG, - NFPG, - r, D,
where GDP is gross domestic product, NFPp is net foreign payments made by the private sector, SG
is current public saving, CO  is public consumption, and NFPG  is net foreign payments made by the
public sector.  Note that D refers now only to the domestic public debt.
For the 'permanent'  values of any variable (private disposable income and public saving in
this section, and other variables in the investment section below) we specify two alternatives.  The
first is defining expectations of the permanent values consistent with partial perfect foresight,  defined- 66-
as the simple average of the contemporaneous variable and two periods into the future, for any
variable x:
(4.5a) Px, =  [x, +  x,.  +  x1* 2 j/3
where Px defines the expected permanent value of variable x
The second alternative is the simple static expectations specification which allocates a 100%
weight to the contemporaneous value in (4.5a), as follows:
(4.5b)  Px,  =  x,
Similar assumptions are made with respect to expected consumption inflation (and expected
investment inflation in section 4.2 below). A fust alternative takes actual inflation between today and
tomorrow as the relevant proxy for rationally expected inflation.  The second alternative is static,
specifying the expected price change to be equal to the actual price change between yesterday and
today.
Equation 4.2 was tested using annual data covering the 1960-1988  period, which is the sample
period used in most of sections 4 and 5 of this study.  This is a relatively long period in Chilean
recent economic history, characterized by significant structural breaks and policy regime changes,
which due  to their intensity introduces a  note of caution when interpreting the statistical results
presented below.
Table 4.1 presents  a selected number of empirical results for the consumption function,
separately for the static ai,J partial perfect foresight (PPF) versions for all expectations.  Lines 1.1
and 2.1 of the table present results for the complete specification of equation 4.2.  In general, the-67.
results of the static expectations version dominate statistically  those related to the partial perfect
foresight case. 17
The average Chilean consumer appears to be partly Keynesian, partly PIH forward looking:
under the static version, her marginal  propensity to consume  out of current private disposable income
is approximately 0.70 and her marginal propensitv to consume out of permanent income is around
0.30. Under the PPF version the corresponding  propensities are of a similar magnitude,  close to 0.50.
Interestingly,  she does not react to permanent public  saving;  i.e., the consolidated  public sector deficit
(abstracting from public investment) has no effect on private consumption. The policy implication
is clear: an increase in public sector saving has a strong effect on national saving, not neutralized by
a decline in private saving.
Of all relevant prices, only the real exchange rate (given by the relative price of imported to
national consumption goods components of aggregate consumption), affects private consumption.
A 10% real devaluation, which would affect directly this relative price, would reduce aggregate
consumption by approximately a 1 percentage point of private disposable  income. However, neithcr
the real  interest rate  nor the inflation rate  have any consistently significant, separate  effects on
private consumption, corroborating previous studies on the interest insensitivity  of consumption in
Chile (Schmidt-Hebbel, 1987, 1988,  Arrau, 1989).
In addition, there  is no evidence of a substitution effect of public spending on privately
appropriate services (education, health) and transfers on aggregate consumption.
Monetary holdings and foreign saving flows exert significant positive influences on private
consumption. While higher base money  holdings tend to relax domestic borrowing constraints faced
by consumers, higher foreign saving is associated to weaker foreign resource constraints. The effect
"7 Ihis results mimics the quarterly structural consumption function results for Chile in
Sclimidt-Hebbel (1988), which are stronger for the backward than for the forward-looking
expectaw1ons  specifications.- 68 -
of the latter variable on private consumption is very strong: from the results one  can infer that
between 42% and 7T  % of the dramatic current account correction which took place after 1981 was
borne by private consumers.
The policy implications  of our results are quite clear.  In the first place, there is no evidence
of a direct effect of the public deficit on private consumption; consumers are neither Ricardian nor
directly crowded out  by public spending in  Chile.  A transitoly deficit reduction  financed by a
transitory tax hike reduces private disposable income, and hence private consumption and saving. If
the tax hike is permanent, private consumption will take the brunt of the reduction in (current and
permanent) private disposable income, without private saving being significantly  affected.
On the other side, there are no indirect effects of domestic financing via changes in the real
interest and inflation rates on consumption. However, if inflation reduces real base money, private
consumption would be affected.
Foreign adjustments have strong effects on private consumption in Chile. The combination
of lower foreign saving and a higher real exchange rate  has a strong negative effect on private
consumption expenditure, as evidenced during the post-1982 adjustment period.
4.2  Private Investment
Following  Easterly et al. (1989) and empirical investment  studies for Chile by Solimano (1990)
and Morocco by Schmidt-Hi o)bel  and Mueller (1990), we specify a behavioral function for private
investment which will  depend on neoclassical  profit and cost variables, liquidity  constraints, and risk
determinants.  To avoid again spurious correlation, we scale all non-stationary variables to GDP.
Therefore we specify the following  generic equation for the private investment to GDP ratio:TABLE 4.1
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION  (CHILE. 1960-1988)
Dependent Variable  Private Consumption  to Private Disposable
Income Ratio (CplDYp)
Equation  c  PD  Yp  ff  re  Pcm  Cp7  N  FS  Rh  RFA  DW
DYr  DY,  Pcn  DY,  DY,  DYr
1. Static Ez,ectations
1.1 OLS  0.71  0.28  0.18  0.05  -0.02  -0.14  0.12  0.29  0.24  - 0.79  1.77
(10.4)  (4.1)  (0.8)  (1.7)  (-O5)  (-3.0)  (0.4)  (3.2)  (1.7)
1.2  OLS  0.74  0.25  0.36  -0.13  0.23  037  - 0.72  1.52
(9.8)  (3.2)  (1.6)  (-5.2)  (26)  (2.5)
I12A  ML  0.66  0.26  029  - 40.08  0.45  0.41  0.59  0.90  1.75
(10.0)  (3.7)  (1.2)  (-2.2)  (3.8)  (2-8)  (35)
13 OLS  0.72  0.27  - - 40.13  0.24  0.48  - 0.70  138
(9.4)  (3.5)  (-5.0)  (2.6)  3.6)
13A ML  0.67  0.27  - - - -0.09  - 0.44  0.42  0.57  0.89  1.50
(10.0)  (3.9)  (-24)  (3.7)  (2.8)  (13.4)
2  Partial Perfec Foresight
2.1  OLS  0.49  0.49  0.002  0.0004  0.08  -0.19  0.04  0.28  0.87  0.63  132
(2.6)  (2.8)  (0.005)  (0.0008)  (1.2)  (-3.6)  (0.09)  (1.5)  (4.0)
2.IA ML  0.18  0.50  0.38  .0.03  0.03  .0.11  0.24  0.52  0.68  0.67  0.89  1.39
(2.9)  (3.6)  (0.8)  (40.6)  (0.4)  (-:LI)  (0.5)  (3.0)  (4.1)  (4.1)
2.2A  ML  0.42  0.48  0.14  - - 0.10  0.58  0.71  0.62  0.89  1AI
(3.4)  (3.7)  (0.4)  (-2.4)  (4.8)  (4.6)  (3.9)
2.3A  ML  OA.3  0.48  - 40.10  0.57  0.73  0.60  0.90  .43
(3.5)  .3.80  (-2.6)  (4.9)  (4.9)  (3.7)
Note  Rho is the rnz-order  residual  correlation cefiient.- 70 -
6)  Ip  I  (PUCK 1, P(&-  K  K=,  ,  PRO,  FC, (4.6  yt=it  - yP 0 p  7y  I  *  1  y
H_  (-  (?  H-  (+)  0+  (  H
Hel-  FSt  VUCK, VY
(+)  (+)  ( )  ( 
where Ip  is private fLxed-capital  investment, Y is GDP, UCK is the user cost of capital and PUCK is
the estimated permanent UCK, K.J/Y is the private sector capital output  ratio and PK.,/Y is its
permanent  estimate,  P,FM,,  is  the  price  ratio  of  imported  and  national  private  investment
components, COT is corporate tax revenue and PCOT is its permanent estimate, KB  is the public
sector capital stock, PRO is corporate profits, FC is banking credit flows  to firms, H is base money,
FS is foreign saving, VUCK is the coefficient of variation of UCK, and VY is the coefficient of
variation of GDP.  Expec.d  signs of partial derivatives  are denoted below each variable in equation
(4.6).
The current real user cost of capital is defined as:
(4.7)  UCK,  =  (P 1,/Ps)  1(iF; - P  1)( I +P  1e) +  6]
where P, is the private investment deflator, iF is the nominal interest rate on banking loans to firms,
P^el,  is the expected rate of change of the private investment deflator, and 6 is the (real) capital
depreciation rate.
The private sector capital output ratio, the inverse of the average product of capital, stands
for both the neoclassical marginal  product of capital (which is a linear transformation of the marginal- 71 X
product under a Cobb-Douglas technology) and for the Keynesian potential to actual output ratio.
Note that private and public capital add up to obtain the total domestic capital stock:
(4.8)  K,  =  K  c  +  K ,
Expected investment inflation is  based  on  an  estimated  AR  structure.  All  expected
permanent variables are specified according to the two hypotheses mentioned in section 4.1:  the
partial perfect  foresight alternative of equation  (4.5a) and the static version of equation  (4.5b).
Finally, the two coefficients of variation are defined as five-period moving variances, two periods
back, the current period, and two into the future.
The empirical results for the private investment functions are presented in tables 4.2A and
4.2B, also for the static and PPF expectation alternatives for all relevant right-hand variables. The
final results reported in the tables exclude three variables appearing in equation (4.6): the relative
price of the two aggregate investment components, corporate taxes, and firm credit.  The exclusion
of the first variable from preliminary results was decided on its implausibly  high coefficient, which
affected many other parameters.  The latter two variables were not included due to lack of data.
The permanent user cost of capital (PUCK) appears to be positive in all and significant in
most equations reported  in table 4.2A.  This seems to  be  a reflection of the  extremely strong
structural breaks occurred during the 1960-1988  period with regard to the functioning of Chilean
financial market, the determination and the levels  of the real interest rate, and hence the dependence
of investment on the cost of domestic financial  capital. TIwo  attempts were done to face this problem.
First, multiplicative  dummies  for the PUCK were specified,  separately for the sixties (D60s) and early
seventies (D70s) in table 4.2A. Second, the original specification  was  tested for the 1976-1988  period,
which starts after the 1974-75  domestic financial market and interest liberalization took place.  The-72 -
corresponding results for the latter sub-period are shown in table 4.2B. However, the brevity of this
more homogeneous period suggests to exercise caution in interpreting the results of this table due
to the smali number of degrees of freedom.
The coefficients of the period-specific dummies in table 4.2A tend to present  the correct
negative s.gn, and are significant in some of the reported results. Take for instance line 2.2  While
the coeffirent  of PUCK is still positive for the 1974-1988  period (0.16), it is close to zero for the
early 1970s  (0.16-0.15)  and it is negative for the sixties  (-0.03 = 0.15 - 0.18). However, for the static
expectations alternative and the  1976-88  period, the user cost of capital is negative and significant
although of small magnitude in the best results presented in table 4.2B.
The lagged capital to current output ratio appears to be negative and highly significant in
most reported results.  This is not a surprising result:  private investment is strongly procyclical  (see
also Solimano, 1990).
More surprise causes the consistently negative influence of the public sector capital stock on
private investment. Due to the fact that we only have a theory for a positive effect of this variable
(crowding-in  of private investment due to positive externalities of higher public past investments in
infrastructure and other public goods), we excluded this variable from the
final results.
Among liquidity  constraint variables, their influence depends strongly on the chosen period.
Tlhis  is absolutely consistent with the change in the role of interest rates and hence of the user cost
of capital during the 1960-1988  period: while quantity constraints were of higher importance before
domestic financial liberalization, their influence was weakened afterwards. Precisely this is the case
of own firm profits and foreign saving, which have a strong influence on investment during the 1960-
88 period as a whole, while disappearing from the scene during the 1976-1988  period.  On the other
side, base money plays an ambiguous and unstable role: while in most sub-periods and specificationTABLE  A
PRIVATE  INVESrMENr LCHL2. 1961-198)
Dpedet  Varble  Prite  wtmail  to GWP  RatIo IpY)
elao  c  D6f  D7%  PU  4PMi  si  7V  VY  Rbo  MW  OW
t.  Sic  eeatlm
tiOLS  0.22  do6  410  Q.12  405  411  Q.17  411  407  401  4101  . U2  129 (33)  (08)  (L5)  (23)  (-3)  (t2.2)  (2.0)  (.1.4)  (45)  (-Ls)  (41)
U2ML(ARI)  l17  403  Q  05  01  406  407  Q  26  411  0.0  4002  427  .7  05  L93 (27  (45  (01)  (LI)  (-8)  (-L6)  (28)  (-L.)  (A4)  (47)  - (59)
13ML (ARI)  at1  -dolS  QS  Q01  407  *  25  0-13  .426  la  a5t  L72 (L0)  (.2)  (6(9)  (2.$)  (04  (.2)  (62)
2  Pul  Pafee  FPadra
1  OIS  Q21  4a27  409  0.06  0.04  418  0.03  Q.22  411  482  43  - 01  L19 (14)  (4)  (  (  (08)  (11)  (03)  9)  (49)  (4)  (47)
22  ML(ARI)  0.1s  421  415  Q16  402  412  0.16  4Q0  405  4-00  48  Oa  0.67  Li (Z7)  (O  (-7)  (&I)  (42)  (-2.0  (L)  (44)  (40)  (.1.)  (4  (12
22  ML(ARI)  020  409  4001  06  412  1  77  - 446  OA  037  L.6 (±5)  (L)  (4M  (2.  (23  (Ls)  (.  (42)  (53)TABLE 4.2B
PRIVATE INVESTMENT  (CHILE. 1976-1988)
Dependent Variabe-  Private lnvestment  to GDP Ratio (Ip/Y)
Equation  C  PUCK  dr!R￿  PtRO  H-  VUCK  VY  Rho  R2A  DW
1.1 Static Expectations
1.1 OLS  035  0.05  4.09  -0.14  0.02  0.51  4.02  0.003  -0.26  - 4a8  3.69
(4.1)  (0.7)  (-1.8)  (-2.2)  (0.14)  (1.7)  (4.1)  (0.5)  (-1.0)
I  )LS  0.36  40.06  40.17  - - 0.26  - - 056  - 0.82  2.95
(05)  (-2.0)  (-7.3)  (1.1)  (.2.3)
13 ML(ARI)  0.37  -0.07  -0.18  - 0.36  - - 4.65  .51  0.95  219
(16.9)  (-3.1)  (-11.7)  (1.9)  (-3-3)  (-1-9)
1.2 Partial Perfect Foresizht
1.1  0.52  0.16  -0.19  -0.07  40.24  -0.32  40.05  0.001  *0.27  - 0.86  291
(Z6)  (1.3)  -1.0)  (-0.5)  (-1.2)  (4.5)  (4.02)  (0.1)  (-05)
1.3 ML (ARI)  0.45  0.10  40.24  -0.49  - -0.55  -0.37  0.95  2.09
(13.)  (3.2)  (-11.1)  (-Z5)  (-2.9)  (-1.1)75 -
alternatives it exerts a negative, non-significant  role, it presents a positive and significant, although
minor influence only in line 1.3 (static expectations) for the 1976-88  period (table 4.2B).
With,  regard to the risk variables (the coefficients of variation of thc user cost and of GDP),
the first one plays a negative although rarely significant role during the complete 1976-88 period,
which disappears during the second sub-period.  Much more important is the variability of GDP,
which affects private investment consistently and negatively  during the entire period, and particularly
strongly during the more recent years.
From the empirical results we can draw the following  policy implications. The financing of
the public deficit via debt issuance is increasingly  felt by private investors in Chile due to its upward
pressure on domestic real interest  rates (see section 4), which affects negatively private capital
formation since the mid-1970s. The other side of the coin is the weakening role of both domestic
and foreign liquidity constraints: while firm profits and foreign saving where important investment
determinants before financial liberalization, they vanished afterward.
No evidence was found on public investment crowding  in effects on private investment. The
relevant variable, which is the public capital stock, does not affect positively  private capital formation.
The foreign adjustment has affected private investment negatively via the relative price of
inivestment  goods, which has increased due to the real devaluations, hence increasing the user cost
of capital.
Finally, investment is negatively  affected by the variability  of GDP.  Therefore a more stable
external environment and stable domestic macroeconomic policies exert a  positive influence on
private capital formation.-76-
S. RELATIVE  EXTERNAL  PRICES  AND THE TRADE BALANCE
his section focuses  on the impact  of fiscal  policies  on the external sector, especially  with
regard to the trade deficit  and the real exchange  rate. 'he  framework  applied  here is derived  in two
steps. The first involves  determining  the relative  prices of exportables  and importables  from the
equilibrium  condition  in the non-traded  goods  market,  and the second  implies  deriving  an equation
for the trade balance. Public  spending,  deficits  and debt stocks  are important  codeterminants  of the
behavior  of these external  sector variables.
Based  on an appropriate  framework,  this section assesses  the impact  of fiscal  variables  on
Chile's  external  sector based  on empirical  findings  related to the 1960-1988  period.
Figures  5.1 and 5.2  depict  the evolution  of relative  export and import prices,  and the trade
surplus  to GDP ratio, respectively,  during  the last three decades  in Chile.
Tbe relative  price of exports to non-tradeables  is strongly  correlated  with the international
copper price, which is the main determinant  of the country's  extemal export prices and terms of
trade.  The price of imports  to non-tradeables  is a more useful  measure of the real exchange  rate
relevant  for spending  and production  (other than copper)  decisions.  However,  both measures  of the
real exchange  rate tend to move together during 1975-1988,  a period of smaller terms of trade
fluctuations  than those  experienced  during 1960-1975.
The two periods  of massive  real exchange  rate appreciations  - the early 1970s  and the early
19BOs  -coincide  with the policy-induced  spending  frenzy  of the Allende  government  and the foreign-
financed  private  spending  spree of Pinochet's  'plata dulce.  Trade deficits,  depicted in figure 5.2,
reach their highest  levels  during  those  years  -the most  dramatic  observation  being  the 109%o  (of GDP)
trade deficit observed  in 1981.FIGURE  5.1
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The  required  current  account  corrections after  1973 and  1981, respectively, led to  fast
reversals of the trade deficits as a result of massive  exchange rate depreciations and reductions in
domestic spending.  However, a  distinct feature  of  the  post-1984 extemal  adjustment  is  the
achievement of massive  trade surpluses, exceeding 6% of GDP in 1988. These are the counterpart
of the significant decline in private consumption as a share of income (discussed in Section 4) and
a progressive correction in public sector deficits (discussed  in section 2).
5.1  Relative Prices of Exoorts and Imports
Following  Easterly et al. (1989) and Rodriguez (1989), the real exchange rate, defined as the
relative tradable/non-tradable goods price, is derived from the continuous market-clearing condition
for  non-tradable  goods  in  the  Salter-Swan-Corden-Dombusch small open  economy  tradition.
Extending this paradigm to a three-sector distinction between expoftables, importables, and non-
tradeables, the market clearing condition can be rewritten as either one of the following  functions
for the relative prices of exportables and importables: 8
'"For the same reason discussed in the preceding sect;on (to avoid spurious correlation) we
scale non-stationary variables (such as the trade surplus, go-ernment expenditure, or net foreign
assets) co appropriate scale variables in equations 5.1 - 5.3.-80-
(5.1)  CX  ,  = ex (77T,tst,  Ut9  YU'  Mt
(+) (?)  (+)  (?  (-
-P  7T'  ty'  y'GM
(5.2)  emCa-Al = em (  M[TT  tMt  _  _  G  Nt
pN1  yt  I  7  "  )
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wheie ex and em are the relative prices of exportables and importables, respectively; Px P.M  and P,
are the absolute prices of exportables, importables, and non-tradables; TP  is the foreign terms of
trade, tM  is the ad valorem tariff rate for imports, iS  is the current-price trade surplus; G is current-
price (general) govemment spending (public consumption  plus public  investment); GN  is current-price
(geueral) govemment spending on nontradeable goods; and Y is current-price GDP.
The above framework was app!ied to Chile using annual data for the 1960-88  period.  The
results are reported in table 5.1 for both equations.  They tend to favor the relative export to non-
traded gor ;s price interpretation as the relevant reduced-form equation for the equilibrium in the
non-tradable good&  market.
The extemal terms of tmde are an important determinant of both export and import prices.
although their numerical influence is much stronger on the former.  The average tariff rateTABLE 5.1
RF.LATIVE  EXPORT AND IMPORT PRICFS (CHtLE. 190-19fl)
Eqti  C  T  tm  TS  G  D75  Rho  R2A  DW r  ~y
1.  ,athe  rau  (a)
1.1 OLS  -021  0.63  4.04  248  .3.64  0.51  - 06  129 (-1.2)  (8.5)  (-0.8)  (4.0)  (3.0)  (4.5)
1.2 ML(ARI)  0.01  0.59  .0.05  2.22  2.50  0.38  052  0.77  1.76 (0.04)  (6.9)  (.0.9)  (3.4)  (1.7)  (4.0)  (3.0)
CD
13  ML (ARI)  -0.02  0.56  -2.9  2.80  037  0.51  0.77  1.74 (.0.0i)  (7.7)  (3.8)  (7.0)  (4.0)  (3.0)
2  Reative  Imo  lPrIe (CM)
2.1  OIS  120  ^0.15  ^0.09  .10  4.62  0.61  - 0.7S  1.03 (6.7)  (-2.0)  (-1.9)  (3.4)  (O.5)  (5.4)
2.2 ML(ARI)  1.26  -0.14  *0.09  2.00  -109  0.47  0.62  0.72  1.65 (5A)  (-1.8)  (-1.7)  (3.3)  (4.8)  (5.7)  (3.9)
2.3 ML (ARI)  1.09  -0.13  .0.09  2.04  0.47  0.60  0.72  1.62 (10.7)  (-1.7)  (-1.6)  (3.5)  (5.7)  (3.6)
24  ML (ARI)  1.08  O.18  2.26  - 0.46  0.66  0.70  158 (9.8)  (-2.5)  (.8)  (5.5)  (4.6)-82-
has a negative (although not significant) influence on both relative prices, which is surprising in the
case of the import price, whici should be positively  affected bv tariffs.
The trade surplus to oLput  ratio has an extremely high, consistent and symmetric effect on
both  relative prices: a one-percent  of GDP  increase in  the trade  surplus implies a  2.0 - 2.5%
devaluation of the real exchange rate.
Aggregate government spending has a strongly positive impact on the relative export price
and a non-significant negative influence on the relative price of imports - in general, its influence
could be of either sign. Unfortunately, it was not possible to include as an additional determinant the
non-traded component of public spending due to lack of  ata.
Finally, 0.38-0.61 of the massive 1975 devaluation could not  be explained by any of the
preceding variables, and hence was treated as an outlier.
5.2  The Trade Balance
The  trade balance is both the difference between output  and absorption and the goods
markets counterpart to the accumulation  of net foreign assets. Depending on which is the underlying
paradigm, the trade surplus is specified as reflecting optimal output  and absorption decisions or
optimal foreign asset accumulation decisions.
In Rodriguez (1989) and Easterly et al (1989), the trade surplus is directly related to the
accumulation of net foreig- assets (NFA).  Private net foreign asset accumulation depends on the
difference between desired and actual (that  is, actual lagged) private NFA holdings, the  former
substituted by its main determinants: the covered interest differential between domestic and foreign
rates, domestic public debt, the terms of trade, aud income.  Public NFA accumulation will reflect
directly, with a negative sign, the (cperational) public sector deficit, for given stocks of domestic- 83-
public debt and base money.  Hence under this foreign asset accumulation version, the generic
equation for the trade balance can be written as follows: 1'
(5.3a)  zst 7Y(  C  i-(i_*+t'+ite)  NFA,,  BD,  TZ  *  7Y,  YS  C  l+i+'i  )  Y.  D'  '  t
(  )  H  (  )()  (  )
where Y is current-price GDP, C is a constant, i is the average annual domestic nominal interest rate
(average of active and passive rates), il is the average annual nominal external interest rate paid on
net foreign assets, E"  is the expected rate of nominal devaluation (defined below), B., is current-
price domestic public sector debt (at the end of the preceding period), NFA. 1 is current-price net
foreign assets (total foreign debt less international reserves at the end of the preceding period), and
OD, is the current-price operational public sector deficit.  Expected signs of partial derivatives are
denoted in parenthesis below each variable in equation (5.3a).
An alternative -,view  of the trade balance is to derive it from the macroeconomic  equilibrium
condition, and hence reliecting production, consumption and investment decisions  which are behind
the determinat;on of  the excess of output  over absorption.  This view links more explicitly the
determination of the trade surplus in this section with that of private consumption and investment
in the preceding section.  However, in order  to maintain a structure as close as possible to  that
postulated  by th1e asset accumulation version above, we  focus now mostly on  those  variables
deternining  production and absorption which also appear in equation (5.3a).
'9Current-price GDP is used as the relevant scale variable. Hence the positive sign of the
constant term C reflects the hypothesized positive effect of income on the trade balance, when
multiplying  equation (3a) by the latter, and abstracting from the presence of multiplicative terms
involving income and all non-scaled right-hand variables in eq. 5.3a.- 84-
The trade surplus  in current prices,  defined  by the excess  of exports  over imports,  equals  the
difference  between  current-price  output and total absorption  (A):
(5.4)  1S  =  Px  - P,m  =  Y-  A
=  Y + [r B 1 + i*NFA_X - 71 - OD,  - Ap
where r is the domestic  real interest  rate paid  on government  bonds,  T is total taxes  net of transfers
paid  by  the private  sector,  A, is  private  absorption  (private  consumption  and investment  expenditure),
As  is public  sector absorption,  and OD,,  is the operational  public  sector deficit  defined as:
(5.5)  OD$  =  As  + rB,  + i  NFAg,  - T
Substituting  functional  forms  for output and absorption  into (5.4)  obtain:
(5.4)  7  =  Y(i,  r ,...)  + [rB_X  + iLNFAg_l - 71 - OD# -
(-)  (-
-A,(NFAp,  B ,NFAg, i  ,  r  7',,YP)
(+)  (+.) (0,+) (?,-)  (?-)  H+ (+)
where the negative  signs  of the interest rates in output supply  denote the effect of the cost of
working capital on current production decisions  (the Cavallo  effect), and the two signs below
dom,tic  public  debt and public  NFA in private  absorption  reflect  the non-Ricardian  (the first  sign)
and the Ricardian  (the second sign' hypotheses  on the role of these assets (are they wealth?)  in
private consumption,  while the two signs  below  the two interest rates in private absorption  reflect
their ambiguous  effect  on private  consumption  (the first)  and their unambiguously  negative  effect  on-85 -
private investment (the  second).  Finally, current  terms of  trade and  permanent  income affect
positively Ap  via private consumption.
Rewriting eq. (5.4') as a functional expression for the trade surplus after scaling all relevant
variables to currezt-price GDP, obtain the following  form, as an alternative to equation (5.3a):
(5.3b)  7  _  C  i-(i'+&+i*+  ')  NFAt,  BD,
ye  Y,  Yo  '  +(i+  +i-&)'  Y  '  Y'
(+)  (-  (?)) 7TT  ODt  YP
.yt  I  y  )
Two differences arise between the asset accumulation version 5.3a and the macroeconomic
equilibrium version 5.3b of the trade surplus: first, the effect of domestic public debt, net foreign
assets, and the interest rate differential are ambiguous  in eq. 5.3b, and second, the ratio of permanent
to current output (an inverse measure of the business cycle) appear in the latter equation.  The
subsequent empirical application will test the relative relevance of these different approaches to the
trade surplus for the Chilean economv.
The empirical results for the Chilean trade balance are shown in table 5.2.
Lines  1.1 and  2.1  present  results  for  the  complete  specification.  Of  the  right-hand
determinants, the interest rate differential (IRD), the total net foreign asset holdings, and the stock
of domestic public debt holdings present positive, mostly significant signs under both versions for
expectations.  To capture a possible break of the relation between the trade surplus and the stock
of net foreign asset holdings in 1981,  the multiplicative  dummy D81 for NFA was included for 1981.
The positive signs  of the former three variables contradict the asset accumulation  version of the trade-86,
balance in eq. (5.3a), but are consistent with the ambiguous signs postulated by the output  less
absorption version of equation 5.3b.
Tle  current extemal terms of trade have a consistently  significant but low positive influence
on the trade balance.  However, the influence of the business  cycle is not significant. A dummy for
1979-1982  (D7982) signals the particular regime of high access to foreign crAdit  which characterized
those years as opposed to all other subperiods. It reflects that the trade deficit was 2-3 percentage
points of GDP higher during those years of easy access to  foreign lending, unhindered by either
domestic or foreign limits imposed to foreign borrowing.
Finally, the operational public sector deficit has a negative though not significant  effect on
the trade surplus under the static expectations  complete specification  for the dependent variable (line
1.1). To test for the influence of this variable  when most others are omitted, we run the specification
of line 1.2.  Having in mind the variable exclusion bias, we may conclude that a I percent of GDP
increase in  the public deficit tends to  reduce the  Chilean trade surplus by a maximum of 0.29
percentage points of GDP.TABLE 5.2
TRADE SURPLUS (CHILE. 19(&9]8
Dependent  Variable Trade Surplus to GDP (lS/Y)
Equation  C  IRD  D81  FA_l  B-  1P  OD,  YP  D7982  Rho  IPA  DW -I.  y  7  7
Staf-  Expectations
1.1 OLS  0.04  0.01  -1.76  050  0.04  0.03  40.12  0.0.03  40.03  - 0.68  1.84
(4.3)  (1.5)  (-31)  (1.9)  (1.0)  (2.0)  (.1.0)  (-1.0)  (-2.1)
CD
1.1 OLS  0.006  40.29  40.06  - 0.39  1.84 (.0)  (4.1)  (-2.6)
Paurial  Pereet  Foresight
21  OLS  .0.08  0.03  -1.61  0.50  0.07  0.04  0.03  .0.02  -0.02  - 0.73  1.97
(.05)  (1.9)  (-2.6)  (2.4)  (2.0)  (3.3)  (0.2)  (4.1)  (-1.4)- 88-
6.  CONCLUSIONS
This section summari7es  the main findings and lessons that emerge from the study of causes
and consequences of budget sector deficits in Chile.
The first, unavoidable observation is about the wild gyrations  of public sector deficits during
the  last two decades in Chile.  In  fact, each  decade comprises a  complete cycle of  fiscal and
macroeconomic  crisis, recovery and consolidation. Tle  1970s  started with consolidated public sector
deficits of 23.4% in  1970-73, which in conjunction with adverse foreign stocks forced a  major
stabilization effort, which was  very successful  on the fiscal  side, culminating  in a 5A% surplus in 1980.
In the early 1980s  the conjunction of negative  external developments and misguided  domestic policies
- this time, however, not on the fiscal  side -caused a major macroeconomic  crisis,  which deteriorated
public finances of both the financial and non-financial public sector.  Quasi-fiscal  rescue operations
of domestic debtors and the private financial system by the Central Bank and emergency programs
combined with a recession-induced  fall of revenue in the case of the non-financial public sector were
behind the large deficits of both public sector, running at 4.9% of GDP in 1986 for the former and
at 4.6% of GDP in 1984 for the latter.
Public sector nationaiization and reform are major causes of the variation in the non-financial
public sector deficit: the tax reforms and public sector nationalization/privatization  of the mid-1970s
increased revenue, while the 1981 social security reform and the tax reductions in the mid-to-late
1980s  destabilized public finances. The strong swings  in the copper prices  were traditionally the most
destabilizing factors outside  the  control  of  policy makers, until  the  copper  stabilization fund
in.;oduced a stronger separation between public spending and copper revenue.
An implication of the high quasi-fiscal  deficits was the huge build-up of total public debt,
which rose from $7.9 billion in 1981 to more than $22 billion.  Nonetheless, our calculations show- 89 -
that the solvency of the total consolidated public sector is not jeopardized by current deficit levels:
a  1.5%  deficit  level  - caused  entirely  by  the  Central  Bank  - is  sustainable  under  normal
macroeconomic conditions.
Section 3 of the paper explored the implications  of domestic financing of public deficits for
the interest  rate  and the  price level in Chile.  The effects of alternative strategies of domestic
financing were discussed and contrasted in the context of a portfolio model with a partial adjustment
structure for both the money and the public bonds markets.
The simulations  based on the estimated portfolio model showed  relatively  conventional results:
money-financed  public deficits reduce interest rates and are strongly inflationary,  while debt-finaiiced
deficits raise interest rates and are only weakly  inflationary. Less conventional was the result that the
moderate fluctuations of interest rates and price levels  during the 1980s  were the result of quasi-fiscal
operations and a social security reform that implied a net transfer of resources to the private sector,
which in turn provoked an increase in the demand for public debt.  This nrivate sector response is
caused by institutional regulations of the social security funds and the banking system. Therefore,
one should not generalize the experience with fiscal  deficits in Chile during the eighties.
Section 4 of this paper went a step further in analyzing the macroeconomic implications of
public sector deficits by assessing  the impact of the public sector on private sector spending in Chile.
Here  the focus was on the sensitivity  of private consumption and investment to fiscal variables, in
addition to indirect effects of fiscal  policies via interest rates, inflation, or private disposable income.
Clear policy implications  can be drawn from our empirical  results on private consumption. In the first
place, there is no evidence of a direct effect of the public deficit on private consumption; consumers
are neither  Ricardian nor directly crowded out by public spending in Chile.  A transitory deficit
reduction financed by a transitory tax hike reduces private disposable income, and hence private
consumption and saving. If the tax hike is permanent, private consumption will take the brunt of the-90-
reduction  in  (current  and  permanent)  private disposable income, without  private saving being
significantly  affected.  On the other side, there are no indirect effects of domestic deficit financing
via changes in the real interest and inflation rates on consumption. However, if inflation reduces real
base money, private consumption  will  be affected. Foreign adjustments have strong effects on private
consumption in Chile. The combination of lower foreign saving and a higher real exchange rate has
a strong negative impact on private consumption expenditure. This was clearly observed during the
post-1982 adjustment period,  when  private  consumption fell  to  historical lows, while private
investment reached historical heights.
From  the  empirical  results  for  private  investment behavior in  Chile  the  following policy
implications can be drawn.  The financing of the public deficit via debt issuance is increasingly  felt
by private investors in Chile due to its upward pressure on domestic real interest rates, which affects
negatively private capital formation since the mid seventies.  The other  side of the coin is the
weakened role of both domestic and foreign liquidity constraints:  while firm profits and foreign
saving were important investment determinants before financial lberalization, they are not more
significant investment determinants since the mid seventies.  No evidence was found on  public
investment crowding in effects on private investment.  The relevant variable, which is the public
capital stock, does not affect positively  private capital formation. The foreign adjustment has affected
private investment negatively  via the relative price of investment goods, which has increased due to
the real  devaluations, hence increasing the user cost of capital.  However, the  recent  external
adjustment period coincided  with a strengthening of the development strategy and stable policy rules,
reducing significantly  policy uncertainty and actual output fluctuations. This reduction of systemic
risk and of uncertainty of main macroeconomic  variables affecting frequently irreversible investment
decisions  has had a major beneficial impact on private capital formation in Chile, as evidenced by our
results and the record levels which this variable is achieving  in the present.-91  -
The foreign adjustment in Chile during the 1980s  has implied a massive real exchange rate
depreciation and a  19 percentage point correction of the trade surplus to GDP ratio (from a 10%
of GDP deficit in 1981 to a 6% surplus in 1988),  required to ensure continuous debt servicing and
supported by a massive  fiscal  correction culminating in a 4.9% of GDP public sector surplus in 1989.
Our results reflect this sensitivity of the trade surplus to the public sector deficit; however, its low
parameter also is consistent with the fact that a significant  share of the trade surplus adjustment was
borne by private consumption.
Which are the lessons from the Chilean experience with regard to fiscal policy management?
Despite the  fact that  the Chilean experience does not  provide an example of 'quick fLx"  policy
packages,  there  are  some  general  conclusions which  are  noteworthy.  First,  a  stable  policy
environment provides a solid stage for adjusting to internal and external shocks. Although difficult
to quantify, there is little doubt that the economic  reforms implemented in Chile before the 1982  debt
crisis were an important stabilizing factor in the fast recovery of the Chilean economy during the
1980s. Second, another important lesson which emerges from the Chilean experience is related to
the need for consistent policies. In particular, the macroeconomic environment must be supportive
of economic reforms.  Finally, investment in both physical  and human capital is a key to economic
growth:  public sector focus on high-return investment in human capital and physical infrastructure,
complementary with private investment which responds vigorousiy to a stable macroeconomy and
market-induced incentives, is showing  to be an effective high-growth road to development for Chile..92v
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APPENDIX  1: REDUCED-FORM  COEFFICIENTS
This appendix  defines  the short-run  coefficients  of assets demand  equations  (3.7)-k3.8)  and
the coefficients  of the reduced-form  equations  for the nominal  interest rate and the price level
(equations  (3.9)-(3.10))  in terms  of the structural  coefficients  of  equations  (3.2),  (3.3),  (3.5)  and (3.6).
The coefficients  of the asset demand are determined  by the following  combinations  of
structural  parameters:
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APPENDIX  2:  DATA SOURCES
This appendix  gives  major sources  of data used in the paper.
Chapter 3
The basic  sources  were: Indicadores  Economicos  y Sociales  del Banco Central  Chile (IES),
Instituto Nacional  de Estadistias  (INE), International  Monetary  Fund Financial  Statistics  (IFS),
Cortazar  and Marshall  (1980),  Haindl  (1986),  Vial  y Marin  (1986),  Le Fort y Ross (1985),  Larranaga
(1989).
i  Domestic  nominal  interest  rate. The average  of the effective  monthly  interest
rate paid on short-term  deposits  (30-89  days). Source: IES.
i*  Foreing  interest  rate. Monthly  average  London  Interbank  offered  rate  in U.S.
dollars  for 180  days  deposit. Source: IFS.
Expected  devaluation  rate of the nominal  exchange  rate.  Source: for the
1975:1  - 1984:3  period  Le Fort and Ross (1985)  and for the 1984:4  - 1988:4
a univariate  method based on the nominal  exchange  rate of the banking
market (IES).
Ml  Narrow  (MI) money  balances. The original  series  was deseasonalized  using
the SAMA  command  in TSP. Source: Vial and Marin  (1986),  IES.
D  Quarterly  domestic  public  debt.  Source: Annual data were obtained  from
Larranaga  (1989)  and correspond  to the debt of the Central Bank  with the
private sector.  The quarterly interpolation  was performed following  the
method described  in Jadresic  (1990).
Y  Quarterly  real GDP. Sources: Haindl  (1986)  and IES.
Anticipated money was estimated assuming  that actual money balances
followed  an autoregressive  process  of the fourth order.
Chapter 4
The basic sources  were Indicadores  Economicos  y Sociales  (IES), Solimano  and Zucker
(1989),  Solimano  (1989).
Cp  Private  consumption.  Source: IES.
CC  Public  consumption.  Source: IES..99-
Y  Annual  real GDP. Source: IES.
I  Private flx,'d-capital  investment. Source:  from 1960 to  the source was
Solimano  and Zucker (1989)  and for the rest of the period  Solimano  (1989).
UCK  User cost of capital. Source: based  on IES data base.
MPK  Marginal  product  of capital. Source: based  on IES data base.
K  This series was elaborated based on  Solimano  and Zucker (1989) and
Solimano  (1989),  using  the pivotal  method  assuming  a ratio between capital
and GDP of 2.5. In addition,  we assumed  that the ratio between  public  and
private  capital  was  similar  to the ratio between  public  and private  investment.
H  Nominal  base monc,  tock. Source: IES.
The rest of the variables  were obtained  directly  from the YES  or derived  from
the variables  defined  above  according  to the definitions  provided  in the text.
Chapter S
The basic  sources  were: Indicadores  Economicos  y Sociales  (IES),  Schmidt-Hebbel,  Castro,
Leng (1990),  French Davis (1984),  Lagos  and Aedo (1984).
Px/Pn  The relative  price  of exportable  and non-tradable  goods. Source: IES  for the
exportable  goods  and Schmidt-Hebbel,  Castro  and Leng (1990)  for the non-
tradable  goods  index.
Pm/Pn  The relative  price of importable  and non-tradable  goods. Source: price of
importable  goods,  YES.
tm  Nominal  average  tax rate on the importable  goods.  Source:  1960-1969:
French Davis (1984). 1970-1973:  current at the 1979 level.  19741979:
Labos  and Aedo (1984). 1980-1988:  elaborated  by the authors.
The rest of the variables  were obtained  from the YES.
Chapter 6
The basic  source were French Davis  and Munoz  (1990),  Madison  (1989)  and ECIAC data
base.
The data on GDP and Investment  were obtained  from French  Davis  and Munoz  (1990)  and
the data on factor inputs from  Madison  (1989)  and ECLAC  data basePRE  Working  Paper  Series
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